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ABSTRACT 
 
Contract farming in China has grown rapidly over the past 10 years. The first part of this 
dissertation examines the evolution of contract farming, and explores the incentives to 
engage in contract farming, preferred contract provisions, and contract performance from the 
perspective of both Chinese farmers and contracting firms. Firm and household perceptions 
of contracting are assessed using data obtained from village and firm level surveys. Farmers 
identify price stability and market access as the key advantages to contracts, while firms 
consider improved product quality as the primary incentive to use contracts.    
In Part II, the survey data are used to empirically analyze the farm level income effect of 
a contract farming program in China. Two methods, propensity score matching and the 
econometric sample selection model, are used to estimate the treatment effect of a contract 
farming program. Four samples are obtained from the survey by restricting the analysis to 
farmer groups of varying levels of homogeneity. Results using the four samples of farmers 
and the two estimation methods vary in important ways. When the sample is the most 
homogeneous, both estimation methods indicate that the contract farming program does not 
substantially increase per laborer’s gross income. 
The third paper develops an applied contract model taking into account hidden 
information and other factors to show the pricing mechanism could result in the exclusion of 
small-scale farmers from the contract production program. The empirical results show that 
small-scale farmers are likely to be excluded out of the contract farming program in China. 
Further a linear pricing method employed by contracting firms is one of the primary factors 
contributing to the exclusion of small farms.  The resulting policy implication is that the 
government should encourage contracting firms to employ a differentiating pricing strategy 
offering contracts with price and quantity provisions. Possible policy instruments include 
contract pricing regulations and the redesign of the government’s grant distribution 
mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
   
Contract farming has been supported by the central government of China in order to 
make agricultural production more profitable and competitive. Contract farming offers a 
means to effectively connect small-scale farmers and large-scale food processing firms. 
Direct benefits from contracting accrue to smallholders from improved access to markets, 
improved technology, better management of risk and opportunities for employment of family 
members. Indirect benefits occur from empowerment of women and increased commercial 
acumen on the part of smallholders. While contract farming promises significant benefits for 
growers in many cases, recent studies (Carney and Watts, 1990; Little 1994; Singh 2000) 
have highlighted circumstances in which members of the rural population have realized only 
limited gains, or have been directly or indirectly harmed by contract farming programs. In 
China either outcome is possible. This dissertation provides a systematic analysis of two 
issues critical to the performance of China’s contract farming program:  the ability of the 
program to increase incomes of participating households and the extent to which the program 
reaches the target beneficiary.  
1. Introduction   
The agricultural sector in China has been fundamentally reshaped during the last 25 years. 
Agricultural output and farm household income have grown continuously, due, to a large 
extent, to the agrarian reforms put into effect by the central government. As with a number of 
government programs currently taking effect, the contract farming program, which appeared 
as a result of the government’s agricultural industrialization program, is a fairly new venture 
for the Chinese agricultural sector. Contract farming, at its best, offers a means to effectively 
connect small-scale farmers and large-scale food processing firms. Therefore, contract 
farming has potential advantages over independent farmer production in restructuring the 
agriculture supply chain and providing farmers with better access to production resources and 
commodity markets.  
The first part of the dissertation performs a general analysis of China’s contract farming 
program from the perspective of both farm households and agribusiness firms. Following this 
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preliminary study, two issues critical to the performance of contract farming program in 
China, have been addressed in this dissertation.  
First, the increasing use of contracts in rural China is not necessarily associated with the 
improved income received by the farmer. The use of contracts could potentially lower on-
farm income, if they reduce incentives for growers to work hard or to invest fully in specific 
productive assets. The fundamental goal of this part of the study is to assess whether contract 
farming plays a positive role in raising farmers’ incomes. We use recent survey data from 
China to analyze the causal effect associated with contract farming programs. We use two 
methods to evaluate whether or not the use of contract farming improves farmer income. One 
method is propensity score matching that involves pairing treatment and control units that are 
similar in terms of their observable characteristics. The second method is the sample 
selection treatment effect model that reduces the selection bias by accounting for the 
correlation between a selection equation and a regression equation. The two methods use 
different techniques to try to correct for selection bias. Both methods are used in an attempt 
to obtain better estimates of the income effect of contract farming after removing the 
selection bias.  
The second concern about contract farming is the program’s ability to reach smallholders 
in order to transfer technology and increase their incomes.  In many countries contract-
farming programs appear to bypass small households.  This concern is critical to China’s 
development because agriculture production is fragmented and a large proportion of farmers 
are very small-scale. The government’s policy objective in creating the contract production 
program was to benefit smallholders and increase their household incomes.  However, if the 
contract farming program tends to attract only large-scale farmers, then the policy objectives 
will not be achieved. Consequently understanding if and why smallholders are excluded from 
the contract farming program is critical to its success. 
2. Thesis Organization 
The dissertation is composed of three interrelated studies, which contribute to an 
evaluation of the performance of China’s contract farming program. Part I examines the 
evolution of contract farming, and explores the incentives to engage in contract farming, 
preferred contract provisions, and contract performance from the perspective of both Chinese 
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farmers and contracting firms. The survey data are described in Section 2. Farm household 
and agribusiness firms’ assessments of contract farming are presented in Sections 3, 4 and 5. 
Finally, conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section 6. 
Part II of the dissertation evaluates the income effect of the contract farming program in 
Chinese farm households. The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the method and 
estimation approaches in the next section. In Section 3, a descriptive review of the survey 
data is presented. Section 4 illustrates the results and implications from the two methods. The 
last section concludes the paper.  
Part III develops a contract model to study the potential used for exclusion of small-scale 
farmers out of contract farming. Section 2 reviews the literature with regard to contract 
exclusion and contract provisions that could be used to exclude smallholders. Section 3 
discusses the pricing strategy that could result in the contract exclusion. Section 4 develops 
two hypotheses and tests them using the survey data from China. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2. CONTRACT FARMING IN CHINA: 
PERSPECTIVES OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS AND 
AGRIBUSINESS FIRMS 
 
Modified from a paper to be published in  
Comparative Economic Studies 
 
Hongdong Guo, Robert W. Jolly, Jianhua Zhu 
 
Abstract 
Contract farming in China has grown rapidly over the past 10 years. This paper examines 
the evolution of contract farming, and explores the incentives to engage in contract farming, 
preferred contract forms, and contract performance from the perspective of both Chinese 
farmers and contracting firms. Firm and household perceptions of contracting are assessed 
using data obtained from village and firm level surveys. Farmers identify price stability and 
market access as the key advantages to contracts, while firms consider improved product 
quality as the primary incentive to use contracts.    
1. Introduction 
Over the past 25 years, the Chinese agricultural sector has been fundamentally 
restructured. Agricultural production and farm household income has grown rapidly, due 
largely to agrarian reforms undertaken by the government. Beginning in 1978, a series of 
institutional reforms significantly transformed a collectivized planned agricultural sector into 
something resembling a capitalist structure. The crucial milestones have been the abolition of 
the communal property base, the introduction of the household contract responsibility 
system, price and market liberalization, the revision to the Land Administration Law in 1998, 
and, most recently, China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Kedliker, 
1992; Oi, 1999; Unger, 2002; Whiting, 2001; Zweig, 1997). The farm household has become 
an active agent in the marketplace in contrast to a passive production unit in the planned 
 
5
economy. After meeting some minimum production requirements from local government, 
farm households at the village level have certain rights to decide what they will produce and 
how to market their products. However, Chinese farmers face a number of challenges – low 
agricultural prices due to large stocks of products, lagging incomes and excess labor in the 
agricultural sector, among others. Externally, Chinese agriculture faces increasing 
competition from foreign products due to China’s recent entry into the WTO and the 
continuing globalization of agriculture. Domestically, Chinese agriculture has moved into a 
new development stage characterized by significant increases in the level of production, 
along with shifts in food demand as a consequence of urbanization and rising incomes. Under 
these circumstances millions of small-scale farm households in China are unable to compete 
effectively and respond to changes in domestic demand and withstand pressure from 
international markets. For many small holders, market access has become increasingly 
difficult and their incomes continue to lag behind the rest of the economy. 
Agricultural officials in China are faced with the problem of how to overcome the limits 
imposed by a fragmented production system, improve the quality and competitiveness of 
agricultural products, and raise the income of rural households. In 2004 a system of subsidies, 
along with infrastructure investments and reform in rural credit institutions, was introduced 
to improve the welfare of farm households. (Gale, Lohmar, Tuan, 2005; Gale and Collender, 
2006). However, institutional innovations to create new ways of doing business also play an 
important role in China’s attempts to modernize its agricultural system and improve rural 
incomes. One of these innovations is contract farming. Contract farming is a fairly new 
venture for the Chinese agricultural sector – one that emerged as a result of the government’s 
agricultural industrialization programs.  
Contract farming has a checkered history throughout the world. At its best, contract 
farming provides a means to manage complex production processes with greater precision 
than is possible through arm’s length market transactions. This can result in higher quality, 
safer food with lower production and marketing costs. In some cases, particularly in 
developing or transition economies, contracting can overcome imperfections in input and 
output markets or institutional deficiencies by providing credit, seeds, machinery services, 
human capital and market access to farmers. However, without adequate competition among 
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contracting firms, informed farmers and rule of law, contract farming may lead to economic 
serfdom for peasant farmers or a food system that meets the economic objectives of power 
elites. (See, for example, Allen and Lueck, 2003; Eaton and Shephard, 2001; Little and Watts, 
1994; MacDonald, et al, 2004; Runsten and Key, 1996.)  
The agricultural industrialization program, of which contact farming is a part, has been 
supported and motivated by the Chinese government with the purpose of making agricultural 
production more profitable and competitive. Contract farming offers a means to effectively 
connect small-scale farmers and large-scale food processing firms. Local governments also 
recognized the potential of contract farming for transforming the structure of agriculture and 
raising farm income. Many have implemented a number of programs and incentives, such as 
credit support and tax reduction for agribusinesses involved in contract farming. 
Contract farming in China has made considerable progress since its emergence 20 years 
ago. Four characteristics can be safely generalized from its growth so far. First of all, the 
number of agricultural commodities produced under contract has increased steadily. 
Agricultural products produced or marketed under contract have grown from small-quantity 
locally specialized products, such as food oil and vegetables, to bulk commodities such as 
corn, beans, rice and wheat. For example, in Jiling Province, the number of contracted 
commodities has grown from 30 in 1999 to 70 in 2000. Second, the geographic distribution 
of contract farming has also expanded greatly. Initially, contract farming was developed in 
the economically advanced coastal provinces. Now contract farming is spreading rapidly into 
the underdeveloped areas of Central and Western China. Many firms sign contracts not only 
with local farmers, but also with farmers in other provinces. Third, the scale of products 
produced under contract (planted areas, volume of cash receipts and number of farmers) has 
also increased. According to the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, the planted area involved 
in all types of contracts reached 18.6 million hectares in 2001, approximately 40 percent 
higher than in 2000. (Niu, 2002). Finally, the number and complexity of contracts have also 
increased. Beyond rather standard production and marketing contracts, some new contracts 
cover food transactions between main production regions and high demand regions and seed 
provision between farmers and research institutions.  
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According to the most recent survey from the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, there were 
4.6 times the number of organizations involved in agricultural industrialization across 31 
provinces in 2000 than in 1996. The number of farmers who signed contracts with firms 
increased twofold over the same period. The proportion of farmers involved in contract 
farming went up correspondingly, from 10 to 25 percent. (Niu, 2002). 
Table 1 shows the level and composition of firms or organizations involved in 
agricultural industrialization between 1996 and 2000, the most recent data available. The 
dominant type of firm is the so-called “dragon-head-driven” company. Dragon-head 
companies are agribusiness firms designated by national, provincial, municipal or county 
authorities with regard to their economic strength, operation scale, level of technology, 
management, and their potential to improve farm incomes. For example, a national dragon-
head firm must meet the scale and management criteria drafted by the National Agricultural 
Industrialization Development Joint Committee. Other rankings are specified by committees 
at corresponding levels. County level dragon-head firms are the lowest level with the 
smallest size and impact within this ranking system. These firms agree to develop production 
or marketing systems that include market access, technology, technical assistance, credit and 
other inputs for local farmers. Most of the dragon-head firm systems involve the use of 
contracts. In exchange for their role in rural development, the dragon-head firms receive 
support from all levels of government and, since 2002, receive financing from the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China. In some cases, the dragon-head firms that are 
engaged in contracting are also encouraged to develop “bargaining associations” for farmers 
in an attempt to create some degree of countervailing power.  
The types of organizational relationships between farmers and agribusinesses over the 
1996 to 2000 period are reported in Table 2. Contracts are the dominant form of farmer-to-
firm relationships. Note, however, that the proportion of contract relationships dropped 
steadily from 70.8 percent in 1996 to 49 percent in 2000. This would suggest that although 
the volume of production under contract appears to be increasing in China, the proportion of 
firms involved in contracting is declining, presumably because other forms of business 
organization, such as cooperatives or farmer-owned businesses, are becoming more 
prominent or are proving to be more effective. Consolidation of firms may also offer 
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explanations, however these trends may be offset by the Government of China’s efforts to 
encourage new firm development. Note, too that cooperatives and farmer-owned businesses 
may also rely on contracts. 
This paper presents information on contract farming from two independent surveys of 
peasant households and designated dragon-head firms. The survey data sketches out some of 
the characteristics of the participants in contract farming, the types of contractual 
relationships being developed as well as the perceived benefits and limitations of contracting. 
A brief profile of a contracting firm and a participating farm household is given in Appendix 
A. 
2. Survey Data Description 
2.1 Farm-level data 
Farm-level data were obtained through a survey conducted by more than 60 
undergraduate rural-area students from Zhejiang University when they returned to their home 
villages during their winter break in February 2004. The survey contained questions on the 
farm household, farm production status and involvement in contract farming. Student survey 
enumerators were carefully trained before they returned home. Each student randomly 
selected 30 households in their home village to survey. The students returned 1820 surveys 
of which 1036 were complete and usable. Because many of the student volunteers came from 
Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Shangdong provinces, more data were collected in these three 
provinces. In total, the farmers included in the survey represent over 13 provinces and 47 
counties, as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 1.  Types of Organizations 
Organizational Forms 1996 1998 2000 
1.  Dragon-head firms 5381 15088 27000 
     % of total 45.51 49.93 41 
2.  Middlemen 3384 8024 22000 
    % of total 28.62 26.44 33 
3.  Government authorities 1450 4848 7600 
    % of total 12.26 15.98 12 
4.  Other types 1600 2384 9600 
    % of total 13.61 7.85 14 
Source: Data derived from the survey of the Ministry of Agriculture, Peoples Republic of China in 1996, 1998, 
2000 reported in Niu, 2002 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Economic Relationships between Firms and Farmers 
Relationship Structure in Different Years  Firm Numbers Percent 
1996  11824  100.0 
1. Contract relationship    8377   70.8 
2. Cooperative    1255   13.3 
3. Farmer-owned business    2222   18.8 
1998  30344  100.0 
1. Contract relationship  16948   55.7 
2. Cooperative    2791   9.2 
3. Farmer-owned business    3396   11.2 
4. Others    7209   23.8 
2000  66000  100.0 
1. Contract relationship  32340   49.0 
2. Cooperative    9240   14.0 
3. Farmer-owned business    8580   13.0 
4. Others  15840   24.0 
Source: Data derived from the survey of the Ministry of Agriculture, Peoples Republic of China in 1996, 1998, 
2000 reported in Niu, 2002 
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2.2 Firm-level data 
Firm-level surveys were conducted by mail and through direct interviews. The survey 
was restricted to designated dragon-head firms. A preliminary survey, conducted in June 
2004, was sent to a small sample of dragon-head firms across China. Return rates were so 
low that a national survey was abandoned. The low return rates were likely due to the 
unwillingness of the firms to share information with University faculty with whom they had 
no established relationships. Instead, to assure a high rate of return through mail surveys, the 
survey population was limited to dragon-head firms within Zhejiang province. Zhejiang 
University has a close relationship with many of these firms and we believed this would 
improve the return rate. The survey was mailed to 111 agribusiness firms in Zhejiang 
province with the assistance of the provincial government. A total of 80 usable completed 
surveys were returned.  During the same period we interviewed an additional 36 firms using 
the same instruments as the mail survey.  The distribution of the various organizational types 
of dragon-head firms and their geographical locations are presented in the Table 4. 
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Table 3.   Regional Distribution of Farmers in Survey 
Regions Households (units) Proportion (%) 
East Area 586 56.6 
                   Fujian 60 5.8 
                       Guangdong 50 4.8 
Jiling 61 5.9 
Jiangsu 23 2.2 
Shandong 128 12.4 
Zhejiang 264 25.5 
Central Area 304 29.3 
Hubei 11 1.1 
Hunan 57 5.5 
Jiangxi 236 22.7 
West Area 146 14.1 
Sichuan 58 5.6 
Yunnan 29 2.8 
Chongqing 30 2.9 
Guangxi 29 2.8 
Total 1036 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Distribution of Different Types of Firms 
Types of Firms Number Percentage 
 
Privately owned 78 67.2 
Collectively-owned 5 4.3 
State-owned 8 6.9 
Joint-venture 11 12.1 
Other 14 12.4 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
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3. Farmer Households 
3.1 Incentives to engage in contract farming 
Out of 1036 farmer households included in the survey, as shown in Figure 1, only 220 
households, or 21.2 percent, of the total have participated in contract farming. However, 
when farmers without contracts are asked whether they would be willing to engage in 
contract farming, 76.0 percent farmers answer positively. Only the remaining 2.0 percent 
indicate that they would not consider a contract if offered. The results suggest that most 
farmers view contract production favorably and would like to be involved in contract farming 
if offered the opportunity. The primary reason farmers do not participate in contract farming 
is the lack of opportunity – no firms in their area were offering contracts (Table 5). Other 
reasons include a lack of perceived benefits, by the households or a lack of interest from 
contractors operating in their area.   
Table 6 illustrates several incentives identified by current contract producers that make 
them willing to engage in contract farming. Farmers strongly identify price stability and 
market access as the key advantages to contracts. Farmers’ concerns about price risk reflects 
the sweeping price liberalization in China’s agricultural commodity markets and the absence 
of market based risk management instruments. However, credit availability and technology 
support provided by contracting firms were also identified by some households. 
3.2 Types of organizations that contract with farmers 
Table 7 presents information on existing and preferred business relationships for the 
farmers. Agribusinesses, cooperatives and middlemen contract with farmers. Some village 
governments and Departments of Technology at the county government level, (responsible 
for the extension of agricultural technology), also contract with farmers. Nearly 70 percent of 
all existing farm contracts are with middlemen and firms. However, farmers would prefer to 
increase contract relations with cooperatives and technology departments and reduce their 
relationship with middlemen and village governments. In many cases, middlemen are the 
only contracting alternatives available to farmers, since cooperatives are not well developed 
in China. The apparent preference of Chinese farmers for cooperatives deserves further 
investigation.  
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3.3 Types of contracts 
Production and marketing contracts are the two dominant contract types (Table 8). 
Marketing contracts involve the collecting and selling of a variety of goods, without the 
contractor’s active involvement in production. Production contracts often involve the 
provision of seed, fertilizer, technology and other inputs by the contractor. (A sample 
contract is given in Appendix B.)  
3.4 Forms of contracts 
Approximately 51 percent of all contracts are written and the remaining are oral contracts 
between agents (Table 9). But the choice of contract form is highly correlated with contractor 
type. Oral contracts are used primarily by middlemen and written contracts are used by firms. 
The reputation and local knowledge of the middlemen, who are from the same villages as the 
contracting farmers can substitute for a written contract. Outside firms prefer written 
contracts that clearly specify rights and responsibilities for both parties.  
3.5 Contract specifications 
Farmers with contracts were asked to provide information on contract duration. Long-
term contracts (more than one year) account for only 17.7 percent; the remaining 82.3 
percent of contracts were short-term contracts of less than one year.  
Several price strategies often used in contracts are identified in this context. The flexible 
price strategy specifies the goods transaction price to be equal to the market price at delivery. 
The price floor strategy defines the delivery price to be the maximum of the market price and 
the floor price set in the beginning period. The fixed price strategy means that the delivery 
price would be fixed in advance of signing contracts. Approximately 44 percent of actual 
contracts reported in Table 10 specified a flexible delivery price that fluctuated with the local 
market. The second most common provision is the price floor, at 27.3 percent. Fixed price 
contracts accounted for 23 percent of the total. When farmers without contracts were asked 
about preferred pricing mechanisms, 68.6 percent selected a price floor and only 20.9 percent 
of farmers would shift to a flexible delivery price. Downside risk protection appears to be an 
important attribute lacking in current contract designs. 
The delivery payment method, as reported in Table 11, is another critical contract 
specification that directly affects farmers. Three payment methods are used in most cases. 
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These methods are cash payment at delivery, the prepaid deposit method that requires partial 
payment to farmers as a deposit in advance, and the pay-after-delivery method that allows 
firms to pay the delivery price within a certain period after delivery. Cash payment at 
delivery is used in half of all transactions and payment after delivery accounts for another 
22.3 percent. Most farmers would prefer immediate cash payments.  
3.6 Enforcement and violation of contracts 
Information presented in Table 12 indicates 60 percent of farmers with contracts did not 
have a conflict with the other party. About 35.9 percent of farmers reported infrequent 
conflict and 4.1 percent of farmers often had a problem with their contractor. As shown in 
Table 13, most conflicts were about price and quality terms. Quality standard vary widely, 
some set by the firms, others by the Chinese government or international bodies. The specific 
standards used generally reflect those required with specific product market. In addition, 
farmers reported that most of the conflicts were resolved by negotiation between farmers and 
buyers and only 2.3 percent of conflicts were resolved in court.  
3.7 Farmers’ perceived benefits 
Farmers with contracts were asked to rank, using a Likert scale, a number of the potential 
benefits of contracting (Table 14). The primary benefits were improving quality of products, 
stabilizing the sale price and lowering marketing costs. However, farmers did not perceive 
significant benefits in reducing production costs and increasing selling prices.  
3.8 Econometric analysis 
According to studies from Lajili et al. (1997), Rehber (2000), Sartwelle et al. (2000) and 
Key (2003), a farmer’s choice to enter into contract farming is influenced by household 
characteristics, operation features, product categories, market attributes and underlying 
environmental conditions. A discrete choice model is constructed in this paper to test the 
hypothesis that a farmer’s decision to engage in contract farming is affected significantly by 
the above factors.  
In the discrete choice model, the choice by farmer households to participate in contract 
farming is influenced by the following five explanatory variables: (1) farmer household 
characteristics (P) that are reflected by education level and risk attitude; (2) the extent of 
production specialization and commercialization (R); (3) agricultural product categories (C); 
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(4) market attributes (T) represented by degree of price fluctuation and distance to the target 
market; and (5) underlying environmental conditions (E) measured by the presence of a 
government support policy and transportation conditions to the primary market. The general 
model takes the form:  
( ) iiiiiii ETCRPFA εβ += ;,,,,  
The above specification can be estimated as a logistic model where iA  is the binary 
choice in which 1 denotes participation in contract farming. A maximum likelihood method 
is adopted to obtain the estimation results. The variables included in the estimating equation 
are listed in Table 15, along with their mean values. Risk aversion was assessed using farmer 
responses to a standard lottery with economically significant gains and losses and an 
expected value of zero. Price fluctuation was determined from a subjective estimate by the 
respondent.  
We used SPSS 11.5 software to run the logistic regression on the 1036 observations in 
the farmer data set. Regression results are presented in Table 16. We briefly highlighted 
some of the key findings. We would have expected a positive relationship between a farmer’s 
education level and his participation in contract farming, but the regression results indicate 
that a farmer’s education level and attitude toward risk have no significant impact on his 
choice probabilities. The reason for this might be that there is only a slight difference in the 
farmers’ education levels, with most at a very low level. The same logic accounts for 
attitudes toward risk, as most farmers rejected the reference lottery. Commercialization in 
production is positively and significantly related to a farmer’s acceptance of a contract. Note 
that this may reflect the impact of the contract on the farm’s output mix. Distance to the 
target market has a significant positive impact on contract choice. If farmers are far from 
their target market, they would consider participating in contract farming. Most exporters 
contract for products with local farmers in order to ensure high quality, lock in adequate 
supplies and ensure timeliness for processed goods going to foreign consumers. Price 
fluctuations in target markets are not significant. Government support is another important 
factor that drives farmers to contract. Its coefficient is significant at the 1 percent confidence 
level in both models. Finally, there is a significant relationship between enterprise type and 
the existence of a contractual relationship. This may reflect the fact that farms with specific 
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enterprises were selected for contracts, or that a contractual relationship cause the farm to 
adjust its output mix. 
4. Agribusiness Firms 
Of the 116 dragon-head firms included in the survey, 100 reported being involved in 
contract farming (Table 17). As shown in Table 18, the primary incentives for firms to 
contract are the stabilization of the supply of raw materials and improvement of product 
quality. Reducing transaction costs and obtaining government support were identified by 16 
and 20 percent of the firms, respectively.  
4.1 Types of contract organizational chains 
Agribusiness firms utilize a number of organizational or supply chains to contract with 
farms. In Table 19, different supply chains are identified with a plus sign to show the type of 
transaction link between corresponding agents. For example, “Firm + Farm” tells us that 
farmers interact directly with firms, while “Firm + Cooperative + Farm” means that 
agribusiness firms deal directly with cooperatives that collect the goods from farmers, with 
no transactions directly between firms and farmers.  
The most common chain is the “Firm + Farm,” used by half of the surveyed firms. “Firm 
+ Cooperative + Farm,” in which cooperatives link farms and firms like a bridge, is the 
second most common type of chain, used by 21 percent of firms. Some firms utilize local 
government authorities, and middlemen to establish contractual relationships with farms. We 
also find that the organizational chains selected by firms are related to farm size. More firms 
choose the “Firm + Farm” chain with larger farms. Firms tend to use an intermediary in the 
supply chain to deal with small farms.  
4.2 Types of contracts 
Among the 100 agribusiness firms included in the survey, 63 firms signed marketing 
contracts with farms (Table 20). The type of contract depends largely on the categories of 
delivered goods. Marketing contracts are used more frequently in the fruit, vegetable and tea 
processing industries, whereas production contracts are more common in the meat and dairy 
processing industries.  
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Table 5. Reasons Farmers Do not Contract 
  No No Process Buyers   
 Contracting Obvious Too  Show No  
  Opportunities Benefits Complicated Interest Total 
Number 426 169 21 200 816 
Percentage 52.2 20.7 2.6 24.5 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
 
 
Table 6.  Contract Farming Incentives 
Incentives Market Access 
Price 
Protection 
Credit 
Support 
Technology 
Support Total 
Number  124 73 17 6 220 
Percentage 56.4 33.2 7.7 2.7 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
Table 7.  Organizational Types Dealing with Farmers 
Type of  Middle-   Village  Dept. of       
Organization Man Firm Government Technology Cooperative Other Total 
Actual        
Percentage 34.1 34.1 12.7 5.9 0.5 12.7 100 
Perferred        
Percentage 18 32.7 8.8 14.4 18.7 7.5 100 
 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
Table 8.  Types of Contracts 
Type of Contracts Marketing Production Others Total 
Households 149 61 10 220 
Percentage 67.7 27.7 4.6 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
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Table 9.  Forms of Contracts (by percent) 
   Forms of Contracts Organizations  
Oral Written 
Total 
Middlemen 64.0 36.0 100 
Agribusiness firms 14.7 85.3 100 
Village government 75.0 25.0 100 
Local authorities 61.5 38.5 100 
 Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
 
 
Table 10.  Actual and Preferred Pricing Mechanisms (percent) 
 Flexible 
Price 
Price 
Floor 
Fixed 
Price 
 
Others 
 
Total 
 
Actual situation 
 
44.1 
 
27.3 
 
22.7 
 
5.9 
 
100 
 
Preferred  20.9 68.6 9.1 1.4 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
 
Table 11.  Payment Methods and Percent of Contracts 
Payment  
Method  
Cash  
Payment 
Prepaid 
Deposit 
Pay-after-
Delivery 
 
Total 
 
Actual 
 
50.0 
 
27.7 
 
22.3 
 
100 
Preferred 66.4 27.3 6.4 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
 
 
Table 12.  Frequency of Contract Conflicts 
 Never Seldom Often Total 
Frequency 132.0 79.0 9.0 220 
Percentage 60.0 35.9 4.1 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
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Table 13.  Reasons for Contract Conflicts  
 
Issues  
Price 
Terms 
Quality 
Terms 
Quantity 
Terms 
Delivery 
Time 
Percent who have experienced  86.4 72.7 6.8 18.2 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
 
 
Table 14.  Perceived Farmer Benefits from Contract Farming 
 Benefit None Somewhat  Significant Total 
 Reducing production cost 31.8 54.1 14.1 100 
 Improving quality 7.3 58.7 34.0 100 
 Increasing selling price 22.3 65.4 12.3 100 
 Stabilizing sale price 10.5 45.9 43.6 100 
 Reducing marketing cost 21.3 44.1 34.6 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
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Table 15.  Interpretation and Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Names Definition  Mean
Household 
Characteristics (P)   
Education level 1=below elementary school; 2=elementary school; 
 3=middle school; 4=above middle school 
2.46 
Risk attitudes 1=risk averse; 2=risk neutral; 3=risk favorable 1.06 
Operation features (R)   
Specialization Income from main agricultural product/total income (%) 0.45 
Commercialization Quantity of marketed products/total production (%) 0.65 
Product categories (C)   
Grain Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.43 
Vegetable Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.13 
Fruit Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.06 
Tea Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.01 
Edible mushroom Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.04 
Floral crops Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.02 
Poultry Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.05 
Meat Dummy variable 1: yes 0: no 0.08 
Market attributes (T)   
Price fluctuation 1=0-10%; 2=10-20%; 3=20%-50%; 4= >50% 2.20 
Target market 1=local market; 2=regional; 3=foreign market 1.20 
Environmental 
Condition (E)  
 
Traffic condition 0=bad; 1=good 0.91 
Government support 0=no support; 1=support available 0.50 
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Table 16.  Farm-Level Logistic Regression Results 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Coefficient (B) 
 
Wald 
 
Exp (B) 
 
Intercept 
 
-3.530*** 
 
41.759 
 
.029 
Farmer characteristics (P)    
Education  -.058 .459 .944 
Risk aversion .285 1.342 1.329 
Operation features (R)    
Specialization .489 2.343 1.631 
Commercialization .574* 3.288 1.775 
Product categories (C)    
Grain .401* 2.665 1.493 
Vegetable .128 .154 1.137 
Fruit .784** 5.248 2.191 
Tea 1.603*** 7.887 4.969 
Edible mushroom .118 .063 1.125 
Floral crops 1.179** 4.419 3.252 
Poultry 1.058*** 7.944 2.880 
Meat 1.194*** 13.750 3.302 
Market attributes (T)    
Price fluctuation -.110 1.762 .896 
Target market .540*** 10.161 1.716 
Environment (E)    
Traffic condition .148 .262 1.159 
Government support .662*** 13.158 1.940 
   
-2 loglikelihood  969.38  
Chi-square value 93.23***  
Nagelkerke R2  0.135  
Note: "*", "**" and "***" represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22
4.3 Forms of contracts 
Most agribusiness firms use written contracts (Table 21). The rank or hierarchy of 
dragon-head firms also influences the types of contracts selected. Lower ranking firms, 
particularly county level firms, choose oral contracts more often, in part because they 
maintain close relationships with local farms and have confidence in each other.  
4.4 Contract specification 
The price floor is the most common delivery price specification approach used by firms 
(Table 22). The price floor is established by the contracting firm and is set near the cost of 
production. The objective of the contracting firm is to limit fluctuations in supply. This result 
is in contrast to the farmer survey that indicated flexible price contracts were the most 
common. Flexible price and fixed delivery price mechanisms are also used in some cases. 
When the rank of dragon-head firms is considered, the price floor strategy is preferred by 
firms of higher rank, whereas flexible pricing works better for lower-ranked firms. Due to 
their strong financial status and the favorable public policy afforded them by government, 
highly ranked firms tend to make better use of the riskier price floor method.  
The amount of price fluctuation in the local market is highly correlated with the type of 
price mechanism (Table 23). When the price is fairly stable, firms tend to accept fixed price 
and flexible price methods. Most firms select flexible prices as price fluctuation increases.  
Table 24 reports the lengths of contracts used by various types of processing firms. 
Longer term contracts tend to be preferred in industries with longer replacement cycles – tea 
or livestock for example. 
The length of the contract is also affected by the price fluctuations of the processed goods 
(Table 25). As would be expected, the wider the price fluctuation due to uncertainty about 
future prices, the shorter the contract period. 
The type of processed good is strongly associated with the use of contracts by firms. All 
firms in the dairy, the aquaculture and honey industries in our survey make use of contracts, 
although the number of these firms included in the survey is small (Table 26). 
Firms were asked to rank the importance of input quality using a four point Likert scale 
(Table 27). Generally, the higher the quality requirement for the raw material, the higher the 
percentage of firms engaged in contract farming. If the target market is in foreign countries, 
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firms tend to use contracts more often (Table 28). If price fluctuation in the local market is 
relatively high, firms are less likely to use contracts (Table 29).  
4.5 Econometric Analysis 
As described in the preceding subsection, we categorize factors into three classes: type of 
firms (E) represented by their rank, characteristics of processed goods (P) denoted by the 
requirement on the quality of raw materials, and corresponding industry and market attributes 
(M). The study only examines four typical goods: vegetables, meat, food oil and tea. 
Explanatory variables along with their mean values are listed in detail in Table 30. The 
general model takes the form:  
( ) iiiii MPEFT εβ += ,,,                                                                        
The dependent variable iT  is binary, where 1 denotes participation in contract farming. A 
maximum likelihood estimation method is used to obtain the estimation results. Excluded 
classes are municipal firm type and all other product categories. The regression results are 
presented in Table 31. 
We are able to draw the following results from the sample data. First, the rank of firms 
has a significant and positive effect on the use of contracts. This may reflect the fact that 
scale and reputation are viewed as favorable signals by farmers and makes them more willing 
to cooperate with highly ranked firms.  
Second, characteristics of processed goods have a certain positive effect on the dependent 
variable, consistent with expectations. The firms in the fresh vegetable processing industry 
are more likely to use contracts, since firms need a stable and timely supply of raw goods that 
are quite perishable.  
Third, price fluctuation in the target market has a significantly negative effect on the use 
of contracts. Firms tend to use contracts in a market with relatively less price variation.  
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Table 17.  Firm Types and Contract Farming 
 Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
Table 18.  Main Incentives to Sign Contracts 
 
Stable 
Supply  
of Raw 
Material 
High 
Quality of 
Delivery 
Goods 
 
Reduced 
Transaction 
Cost 
 
Stabilized 
Delivery 
Price 
 
Government 
Support 
Obtained 
 
 
 
Total
Number of 
Firms 78 77 16 44 20 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
 
 
 
Table 19.  Farm Size and Organizational Chains 
Types of Chains (by percent)  
 
 
Farm Size 
 
Firm 
+Farm 
Firm+ 
Village 
+Farm 
Firm+ 
Cooperative 
+Farm 
Firm+ 
Middlemen 
+Farm 
Firm+Local  
Authority 
+Farm 
 
Number of 
firms 
Small 
 
  50 
 8.0 
 
 8 
 62.5 
 
 21 
 28.6 
 
 14 
 21.4 
 
 4 
 25.0 
Relatively small  10.0  35.0  71.4  78.6  50.0 
Large  66.0  2.5  0.0  0.0  25.0 
Very large  16.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Total  100  100  100  100     100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
Type of Firm Without Contract With Contract Total 
Quantity 1 9 10 National 
(%) (10.0) (90.0) (100) 
Quantity 4 66 70 Provincial  
(%) (5.7) (94.3) (100) 
Quantity 7 16 23 Municipal  
(%) (69.6) (30.4) (100) 
Quantity 4 9 13 County 
(%) (30.8) (69.2) (100) 
Total  16 100 116 
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Table 20.  Categories of Goods and Contract Type 
Number of Firms Using Contract Type 
(Percent) Categories of Goods 
Marketing Contract Production Contract 
Total 
Vegetable processing 
(%) 
21 
(65.5) 
8 
(34.5) 
29 
(100.0) 
Meat processing 
(%) 
4 
(40.0) 
6 
(60.0) 
10 
(100.0) 
Food oil processing 
(%) 
10 
(71.4) 
4 
(28.6) 
14 
(100.0) 
Fruit processing 
(%) 
3 
(100.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
3 
(100.0) 
Aquaculture 
(%) 
6 
(48.3) 
8 
(51.7) 
14 
(100.0) 
Dairy 
(%) 
0 
(0.0) 
3 
(100.0) 
3 
(100.0) 
Tea 
(%) 
8 
(100.0) 
1 
(0.0) 
9 
(100.0) 
Silk 
(%) 
0 
(0.0) 
2 
(100.0) 
2 
(100) 
Edible mushroom 
(%) 
2 
(50.0) 
2 
(50.0) 
4 
(100.0) 
Bee honey 
% 
1 
(100) 
1 
(0.0) 
2 
(100.0) 
Other goods 
% 
6 
(40.0) 
4 
(60.0) 
10 
(100.0) 
Total 37 63 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
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Table 21.  Contract Forms and Rank of Firms 
Contract Form  
Rank of Dragon-
Head Firms 
Percentage of  
Oral Contracts 
Percentage of  
Written Contracts 
 
 
Total 
National 11.1 88.9 100 
Provincial 14.2 84.8 100 
Municipal 12.5 87.5 100 
County 66.7 33.3 100 
Source:  Primary survey 2004 
  
 
 
Table 22.  Rank of Firms and Price Specification 
 
Price Specification  
Ranks of Dragon- 
Head Firms 
Flexible 
Price 
Price 
Floor 
Fixed 
Price 
 
Others 
 
 
 
Total 
 
National 22.2 66.7 11.1 0.0 100 
Provincial 28.8 57.6   4.5 9.1 100 
Municipal 37.5 50.0   6.3 6.3 100 
County 33.3 55.6 11.1 7.0 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
 
 
Table 23.  Width of Price Fluctuation and Price Specification 
 
Price Specification Methods 
 
Width of Price 
Fluctuation Flexible Price Price Floor Fixed Price Others 
 
 
Total 
 
Very narrow 
 
25.0 
 
0.0 
 
50.0 
 
0.0 
 
100 
Narrow 32.8 57.8 6.3 3.1 100 
Wider 30.8 61.5 0.0 7.7 100 
Very wide 56.7 10.0 0.0 33.3 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
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Table 24.  Categories of Goods Processed and Contract Period 
Contract Period 
Types of Goods 
Processed 
Less 
than 1 
year 
1-2 years 2-3 years Over 3 years 
Total 
Vegetable 44.8 27.6 6.9 20.7 100 
Meat 30.0 60.0 0.0 10.0 100 
Edible Oil 50.0 35.7 7.1 7.1 100 
Fruit 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3 100 
Aquaculture 21.4 50.0 14.3 14.3 100 
Diary 33.3 33.3 14.3 33.3 100 
Tea 22.2 11.1 22.2 44.4 100 
Silk 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 100 
Edible mushroom 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 100 
Bee honey 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Others 30.0 40.0 20.0 10.0 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25.  Width of Price Fluctuation and Contract Period 
Contracting Period (percentage of firms)  
Width of 
Price 
Fluctuation 
Less than 1 
year 1-2 years 2-3 years 
Over 3 
years 
 
 
Total 
Very narrow 50.0 25.0 15.0 10.0 100.0 
Narrower 29.7 42.2 17.5 10.6 100.0 
Wider 52.4 34.6 9.2 3.8 100.0 
Very wide 53.3 38.7 8.0 0.0 100.0 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
28
 
Table 26.  Processed Products and Contract Farming 
 Without Contract With Contract Total 
Vegetables 2 
6.5 
29 
93.5 
31 
100 
Meat  2 
16.7 
12 
83.3 
14 
100 
Edible oil 5 
26.3 
14 
73.7 
19 
100 
Fruit 2 
40.0 
3 
60.0 
5 
100 
Aquaculture 0 
0.0 
14 
100.0 
14 
100 
Dairy 0 
0.0 
3 
100.0 
3 
100 
Tea 1 
10.0 
9 
90.0 
10 
100 
Silk 0 
0.0 
2 
100.0 
2 
100 
Edible mushrooms 0 
0.0 
4 
100.0 
4 
100 
Bee honey  0 
0.0 
2 
100.0 
2 
100 
Other 4 
26.7 
11 
63.3 
15 
100 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
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Table 27.  Input Quality Requirement and Contract Farming 
Quality Level Without Contract With Contract Total 
Low 
(%) 
1 
33.3 
2 
66.7 
3 
100 
Relatively high 
(%) 
4 
11.1 
32 
89.9 
36 
100 
High 
(%) 
10 
21.7 
36 
78.3 
46 
100 
Very high 
(%) 
1 
3.2 
30 
96.8 
31 
100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
Table 28.  Target Market and Contract Farming 
Target Market 
 
Without Contract 
 
With Contract 
 
Total 
 
Domestic market 
(%) 
 
13 
16.3 
67 
83.7 
80 
100 
Foreign market 
(%) 
3 
8.3 
33 
91.7 
36 
100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
Table 29.  Price Fluctuation and Contract Farming 
 
Price Fluctuation Without Contract With Contract 
 
Total 
Very narrow 
 
1 
14.3 
6 
85.7 
7 
100.0 
Narrow 9 
11.2 
71 
88.8 
80 
100.0 
Wider 4 
15.4 
22 
84.6 
26 
100.0 
Very wide 2 
66.7 
1 
33.3 
3 
100.0 
Source: Primary survey 2004 
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Table 30.  Interpretation and Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Names Definition Mean 
Types of firm (E)   
National  Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.09 
Provincial Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.60 
  Product characteristics (P) 
Categories   
Vegetable Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.27 
Meat Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.09 
Edible Oil Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.14 
Tea Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.08 
Quality requirement 1=low; 2=relative high; 3=high; 
4=very high 
2.91 
Market attributes (T)   
Foreign market Dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no 0.31 
Price fluctuation 1=never; 2=narrower; 3=wider; 
4=very wide 
2.22 
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Table 31.  Results on Factors that Influence Firms in Engaging in Contract Farming 
Explanatory 
Variables  Coefficient Wald Exp (B)  
 
Types of firm (E)     
National  2.57*   3.81 13.10  
Provincial      3.18*** 13.40 23.92  
Product characteristics (P)     
Categories     
Vegetable     2.97**   7.85 19.40  
Meat 0.13   0.01  1.14  
Food oil 1.45   1.83  4.26  
Tea 1.39   1.00  4.00  
Quality requirement 0.23   0.30  1.26  
Market attributes   (T)     
Foreign market 0.03   0.01  1.03  
Price fluctuation   -1.14**   4.14  0.32  
Intercept 1.18   0.47  3.26  
 
Overall Tests     
Prediction accuracy   91.4%   
-2loglikelihood  67.05   
Chi-Square value     26.03**   
Nagelkerke’ R2    0.364   
Note: "*", "**", "***" represent  significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on t values. 
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5. Contract Performance 
The firm level survey allows us to analyze the potential factors that influence a contract’s 
performance and the likelihood of violation. We define acceptable contract performance if 
the ratio of acceptable contracts to the total number of contracts, is 75 percent or greater. Our 
data indicate that 72 percent of firms with contracts have a performance ratio higher than the 
75 percent benchmark. About 10 percent have less than 50 percent acceptable performance. 
Reasons for contract failure include unacceptable delivery quality and contractees selling 
products to other parties for a higher bid price. Resolution of contract disputes is difficult. As 
many as 53 percent of firms report that there is no way to resolve conflicts. Legal action 
occurs in seven percent of contracting firms. Another 7 percent rely on local government to 
resolve disputes. Generally speaking, the legal mechanism used to guarantee high contract 
performance is less important than other types of informal mechanisms. Contract violation is 
strongly associated with farm size. We find that 79 percent of firms report contract violations 
with small farms, 14 percent with middle sized farms, and only 7 percent with large farms. 
Smaller farms may fail to perform well because they are not specialized and incentives for 
growers are weak.  
The firm level survey reveals that contract performance is influenced by the type of 
contract organizational chain (Table 32). Contract performance under the “Firm + 
Cooperative + Farm” chain is highest, with “Firm + Middlemen + Farm” next. The “Firm + 
Local or Village Government + Farm” supply chains have the worst performance.  
Table 33 summarizes a number of contract provisions and performance. Marketing 
contracts perform somewhat better than do production contracts. Oral contracts appear to 
perform somewhat better than written contracts. The result seems contrary to expectations, 
but it indicates the importance of reputation and social networks in the Chinese rural 
economy.  
The performance ratio is highest with a price floor and lowest for a flexible price 
mechanism. For payment method, the pre-paid deposit method has a better performance ratio 
than cash payment at delivery time or after delivery time. Comparing the length of contract 
period and performance rate suggests that contracts written for less than one year or longer 
than three years perform better, using the 75 percent benchmark. 
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The use of performance standards where a contractor specifies a minimum quality 
standard for example, significantly influences the performance rate. We also find that the use 
of direct incentives, such as bonuses to farms that successfully implement contracts, 
encourage a higher performance rate. Finally, the existence of an indemnification clause that 
requires compensation if the contract terms are violated also improves performance.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study examines the extent and performance of contract farming from the 
perspectives of Chinese farm households and contracting agricultural firms. The farm-level 
survey indicates that the actual proportion of farms engaged in contract farming is relatively 
low and significantly less than the proportion of farm households willing to produce under 
contract. A lack of contract opportunities is the most frequently cited reason, particularly for 
smaller farms. Farmers identify price stability and market access as the key advantages to 
contracts, while firms consider improved product quality as the critical incentive for contract 
use. The organizational chain “Firm + Cooperative + Farm” appears to be viewed as the most 
desirable way to maintain contracts, although the use of middlemen and direct “Firm + 
Farm” contracting are the most common types at present. Marketing contracts are more 
common than production contracts, both for firms and growers. Oral contracts are most 
commonly used by middlemen and county-level dragon-head firms because of strong social 
capital and social networks in rural areas. The price floor provision is favored by most 
farmers because it limits downside risk exposure and still allows them to take advantage of 
price increases. Cash payment at delivery time is the preferred payment method. The short-
term contract is the main type used with growers, but both the type of commodity and the 
commodity’s price fluctuation affect contract length to a certain degree. 
Logistic regression suggests that for farmers, acceptance of contracts is influenced by 
enterprise type, marketplace attributes, public policy and the farm’s production 
characteristics. Econometric analysis also shows that quality requirements for delivered raw 
material, price volatility and public support policies encourage firms to utilize contracts. 
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Table 32.  Organizational Chain and Contract Performance 
Organizational Chain Performance Ratio Total 
 < 25% 25% -50% 50%-75% > 75%  
Firm+Farm 4.0 16.0 24.0 56.0 100 
Firm+Village 
Government+Farm 0.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 100 
Firm+Cooperative+Farm 0.0 9.5 14.3 76.2 100 
Firm+Middlemen+Farm 0.0 14.3 21.4 64.3 100 
Firm+Local Government+Farm 0.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 100 
Source: Primary survey 2004  
 
Table 33.  Contract Provisions and Performance 
Contract Performance Ratio Total 
 less 25% 25% -50% 50%-75% above 75%  
Contract Type      
    Marketing contract 3.2 15.9 25.4 55.6 100 
    Production contract 0.0 13.5 18.9 67.6 100 
Contract Form      
    Oral 0.0 16.4 10.0 73.8 100 
    Paper 1.2 9.5 21.4 67.9 100 
Delivery Price      
    Flexible price 2.9 11.8 35.3 50.0 100 
    Price floor 0.0 9.6 1.9 88.5 100 
Payment Method      
   Cash payment 1.8 10.5 17.5 70.2 100 
   Pre-paid deposit 0.0 16.7 8.3 75.0 100 
Payment-after-delivery 0.0 4.3 26.1 69.6 100 
   Contract Length      
   Less 1 year 2.9 11.8 8.8 76.5 100 
  1-2 years 0.0 7.9 23.7 68.4 100 
  2-3 years 0.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 100 
  More than 3 years 0.0 0.0 22.2 77.8 100 
Quality Requirement      
  With 0.0 0.0 9.4 90.6 100 
  Without 4.3 31.9 38.3 25.5 100 
Incentives      
  With 0.0 5.7 20 74.3 100 
  Without 3.3 23.3 26.7 46.7 100 
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The study shows that the overall successful implementation rate of contracts is still low.  
Key reasons for contract violation include the failure of delivered goods to meet the contract 
quality requirements and the sale of contract goods to other parties if prices are higher. 
Contract violation is common with smaller farms.  
Our results also show that the degree of commercialization is associated with a higher 
likelihood of contract farming. Public policies that encourage the adjustment of the 
agricultural structure so as to improve farmers’ options for specialization and 
commercialization should be made right now. The development of farmer cooperatives is 
another critical public policy consideration. Firms have to incur increased contracting and 
monitoring costs when confronted with a fragmented farm structure. Bargaining associations 
or other types of cooperatives might reduce transaction costs and generate better performance. 
Further, a more stable external environment would increase the use of contracts and improve 
contract performance. In addition better risk management instruments for both contractors 
and farmers should improve supply chain management. In the absence of well developed 
futures markets wider use of floor price provisions might offer a reasonable start. Public 
policy can encourage contract farming from the perspective of both firms and farms. 
Government has a responsibility to monitor the performance of contacts by protecting the 
rights of both parties. In addition, credit support, tax benefits and access to improved 
technology can encourage more dragon-head firms and farms to consider contract production. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROPENSITY SCORE AND SELECTION 
MODEL EVALUATION OF THE INCOME EFECT OF 
A CONTRACT FARMING PROGRAM IN CHINA 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses recent survey data to empirically analyze the welfare achievement of a 
contract-farming program carried out in China. Two methodologies are discussed and used 
for estimation. First the method of propensity score matching is outlined to investigate the 
treatment effect of offering contract farming. A couple of matching algorithms are tried and 
results are compared. Second, in contrast, the income effect of the contracting program is 
examined by the use of the sample selection treatment effect model from econometrics. Four 
samples, upon which these methods are applied, are obtained from the survey. We find 
evidence in the full sample that contract production tends to bring significantly higher 
income to growers than independent production. But this welfare improvement becomes 
smaller and less significant as homogeneous farmers are concerned. The average contract 
contribution to income is weakly negative in each sample using the treatment effect model in 
that a certain selection bias was removed. The sample classification helps to obtain the 
consistent results, namely our two classes of estimation methods both indicate that contract-
farming program does not substantially raise income for the homogeneous farmers. 
1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the food and agricultural sector in China have experienced the dramatic 
change, in the structure and the development of the Chinese economy into a market driven 
and globally integrated economy. During this period the agricultural production and farm 
household income in China have grown rapidly. Rural industries have absorbed a large part 
of farm labor, and poverty has fallen dramatically. Most of these improvements are largely 
driven by a series of agricultural reforms that have been instigated by the government. In line 
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with the improving economic situation, government priorities have shifted from increasing 
production, especially of food grains, to rural income support and, more recently, to 
environmental concerns. As with a number of government programs currently taking effect, 
contract farming, which emerged as a result of the government’s agricultural industrialization 
program, is a fairly new venture for the Chinese agricultural sector. The central government 
has attempted to encourage contract farming by implementing a series of incentive measures, 
such as the financial support and tax credits Contract production in China has made 
considerable progress since its emergence 20 years ago. Both the number of varieties of 
agricultural commodities and the total productions under contract has increased steadily.  
Contract farming offers a means to effectively connect small-scale farmers and large-
scale food processing firms. It is generally recognized that contract farming has potential 
advantages over independent farming in reshaping the agriculture supply chain and providing 
farmers better access to production resources and commodity markets. However, a growing 
literature discussing the dangers of contract farming for small holders, particularly in 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America, has received considerable attention 
recently (Carney and Watts, 1990). Little (1994) argues that contract farming is exploitative 
when it involves a highly unequal power relationship so that contract farmers are relegated to 
the status of hired hands. Under these situations a contract program fails to achieve its initial 
goal and becomes detrimental to farmers. Consequently, the government’s expenditures on 
the program would be wasted and even produce an unexpected inverse effect.  
The increasing number of contracts used in rural China is not necessarily associated with 
improved income. A number of conceivable benefits from contract production accrue to 
small holders coming from improved access to markets, better management of price risks, 
and widespread credit and technology support. However, the use of contracts could 
potentially lower on-farm income if they reduce incentives for growers to work hard or to 
invest fully in specific productive assets. In addition, because the contractors generally have 
greater bargaining power when there are a lot smaller growers, they do not fully reward 
grower effort, effectively exploiting the contract arrangement as occurs in other developing 
countries. 
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Our concerns here are with the micro-level impact of contract farming in China on 
individual farmers rather than on the macro-level impact on the economy. Contract farming 
has its downsides, but it may be beneficial overall in some cases. The goal of this paper is to 
assess whether contract farming plays a positive role in raising farmers’ incomes. We use 
recent survey data from China to analyze the causal effect associated with contract farming 
programs. We use two seemingly related methods to carefully evaluate whether the use of 
contract farming improves farmer income. One method is the method of propensity score 
matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1985) that involves pairing treatment and control 
units that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics. The propensity score is the 
probability that an agent takes treatment, in this case a contract, conditional on the available 
covariates. It is well recognized that the sample selection bias can be corrected to a large 
extent by the use of the propensity score matching method. Selection bias, or participation 
bias, can arise in this application, because farmers must choose to participate in contracts; it 
is not a randomized study. A number of matching algorithms, such as nearest neighbor 
matching, caliper matching and kernel matching, have been introduced in the related 
literature. The second primary method is the sample selection treatment effect model from 
econometrics (Greene, 2001) that reduces the selection bias by accounting for the correlation 
between a selection equation and a regression equation. The two methods use different 
techniques to try to correct for the selection bias. Both methods are used in an attempt to 
obtain better estimates of the income effect of contract farming after removing the selection 
bias.  
In studies that analyze treatment effects, data often do not come from experimental 
designs but from non-experimental observations. Under non-randomized studies, the direct 
comparison of a treatment group with a control group tends to generate a biased estimate of 
the causal effect of treatment on an outcome due to problems such as self-selection or some 
systematic judgment by the researcher in selecting units to be assigned to the treatment 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) first suggested propensity score 
matching (PSM) as a method to reduce the dimensionality of the observable characteristics 
so as to obtain a more manageable summary of covariates and still produce a less biased 
estimate of a treatment effect. This method has become increasingly prevalent in the 
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evaluation of social programs since its introduction. Papers using PSM methods in this area 
have focused on two approaches. First, papers including Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) 
discuss the decisions that must be made to implement the matching algorithms and how to 
produce better performance. Second, other papers focus on applications of the PSM method 
to real situations. Benjamin (2003) studied the impact of 401(k) eligibility on savings to 
identify whether or not 401(k)’s have encouraged additional savings. The PSM method in 
this case was carefully carried out by creating propensity score subclasses and then 
aggregating results across subclasses. The paper concluded that, on average, about one-- half 
of 401(k) balances represent new private savings. As another example, Levine and Painter 
(2003) focused on the impact of teenage pregnancy on drop-out rates and college attendance 
using PSM. These authors used propensity score caliper matching with matching within 
schools to control for school and regional effects.  
The limited dependent variable model, such as a Logit model, allows us to estimate a 
farmer’s probability to engage in contract farming given that contract farming is available. 
To evaluate the impact of contracting on farm income we must control for differences 
between farmers who choose to contract and those that do not. Except for the scale of 
production, contract farmers may be more risk averse, farther from the target market and 
more limited in developed regions. However, a number of elements, such as personal 
contracts, trust of the government and knowledge about markets, are correlated with both 
contracting and income, but are not within the range of our survey observation. When this is 
the case, a simple regression of farm income on a contracting dummy indicator will provide a 
biased estimate of the impact of contracting on farm level income. The problem is one type 
of self-selection: farmers who choose to contract would have had relatively high income 
whatever the decision they make regarding whether to have contracts or not. To control for 
the potential endogeneity of access to the contract markets, we use the sample selection 
model to account for the limited information on unobservable elements affecting both 
contract access and farm level income. In the procedure of Heckman, two equations are 
estimated at the same time. One is the Logistic equation that estimates the probabilities to 
contract or not to contract. The other one is the main income regression equation that 
identifies the effect of contracting adjusted for other explanatory factors. The sample 
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selection bias can be remedied to a certain extent by the use of the joint distribution of the 
two disturbances in the models.  
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the method and estimation approaches in 
the next section. In the Section 3, a descriptive review of the survey data is presented. 
Section 4 illustrates the results and implications from the two methods. Section 5 concludes 
the paper.  
2.  Methodology and Estimation 
2.1 The matching model and the sample selection regression model 
To illustrate the matching method explicitly, we will describe a prototype model of 
economic choice outlined by Heckman and Lozano (2004). Two potential outcomes ( )10 , ii YY  
for each individual unit are considered. Let 1=iD  when 1iY  is selected, and 0=iD if 0iY  is 
selected. The choice of treatment assignment is based on utility maximization described by 
the standard random utility model (RUM). Let latent variable iV  denote the utility for unit 
i and define ( ) 01 1 iiiii YDYDY −+= , where 
( )iViVi UXV ,μ=  and, ( )01 >= ii VD                                        (1) 
where iX  are observed factors, iVU  are unobserved factors determining choices, and 1(·) is 
an indicator function. Potential outcomes are written in terms of the same observed variables 
iX  and unobserved outcome-specific variables ijU , 1,0=j . So 
( )111 , iii UXY μ=  and ( )000 , iii UXY μ=                                    (2) 
The corresponding individual level treatment effect is ( )01 iii YY −=τ . The average 
treatment effect is ( )01 ii YYE −=τ . The fundamental problem in identifying a causal effect is 
that each individual is only observed in one state of the world, but never in both, and thus the 
counterfactual is unavailable. Nevertheless, it does not induce any trouble in estimating 
treatment effects in a randomized experimental setting because the randomization mechanism 
makes potential outcomes and treatment assignment independent by design. Consequently, 
( ) ( )0|1| =−== iiii TYETYEτ  is estimated without bias by he difference in observed means 
within treatment assignment groups.  
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To examine more closely how the matching method works and to note distinctions 
between it and the sample selection model specified later, the additively separable 
specifications and an assumption on the error terms are made to the above utility functions to 
obtain the following more familiar equation forms:  
( ) iViVi UXV += μ  ,        ( ) 0=iVUE                                     (3) 
( ) 111 iii UXY += μ  ,          ( ) 01 =iUE                                    (4) 
( ) 000 iii UXY += μ ,         ( ) 00 =iUE                                     (5) 
where 1iU , 0iU  and ivU  are dii ..  with zero means conditional on iX . Furthermore, 1iU  and 
0iU  may be correlated, but both are independent of ivU . The sample selection model 
addressed in next subsection relaxes this independence assumption by allowing for 
correlation between the error terms.  
Three types of estimands derived from this model are typically of interest, namely 
average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect for the treated population (ATT) 
and marginal treatment effect (MTE), all conditional on observed covariate values (Heckman 
and Lozano, 2004). In many cases, the primary treatment effect of interest in a non-
experimental context (observational study) is the treatment effect on the treated population. 
Throughout the paper we will focus on ATT. The ATT is defined as  
( )1,|| 011 =−== iiiiD DXYYEτ  
( ) ( )1,|1,| 01 =−== iiiiii DXYEDXYE                         (6) 
The missing data problem here arises because of the fact that we cannot observe 0iY  for 
treated units and 1iY for the non-treated units. So the estimand described by the whole 
expression cannot be estimated directly. From the samples we are able to obtain unbiased 
estimates of ( )1,|1 =iii DXYE  and ( )0,|0 =iii DXYE . The resulting ATT bias from 
comparing ( )1=iD and ( )0=iD  means is the difference between the average 0iY  for 
participants and non-participants, and is given below.  
Bias  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]1,|0,|1,| 0101 =−−=−== iiiiiiiiii DXYYEDXYEDXYEATT  
                               ( ) ( )[ ]0,|1,| 00 =−== iiiiii DXYEDXYE                                     (7) 
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To remove the selection bias due to observable variables, matching methods are often 
implemented. The fundamental assumption behind these methods, named by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), is called ignorability of treatment assignment or ignorability due to selection 
on observables. To further reduce the dimensionality problem rising in covariate matching, 
matching on propensity score is an alternative that focuses on scalar matching instead of 
multiple-dimensional matching, but provides the coarsest balancing score. The following two 
assumptions are required for the treatment assignment to be ignorable:  
( ) XDYY |, 10 ⊥                 Unconfounded assumption                     (M1) 
and 
( ) ( ) 1|1Pr0 <==< XDXp           Common-support assumption                   (M2) 
where ⊥  represents statistical independence given the conditioning covariates. The 
unconfoundedness assumption suggests that, even though ( )10 ,YY  and D might be correlated, 
once we control for X they are independent. The common-support asssumption implies that, 
for each X, in very large samples there are observations for which we observe a 0Y  and other 
observations for which we observe a 1Y . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, Theorem 3) show that 
under conditions (M1) and (M2) the assignment to treatment is also unconfounded given the 
propensity score ( )xp : 
( ) ( )XpDYY |, 10 ⊥                                           (P-1) 
( )( ) 1|1Pr0 <=< XpD                                         (P-2) 
Under these conditions, conditioning on the propensity score eliminates the ATT bias 
since we can now directly estimate the counterfactual of interest without producing bias. The 
following formulas express the equivalence of estimands under the assumption P1 and P2.  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )XpYEXpDYEXpDYE |,0|,1| 000 ====            (8) 
In fact, we only need the weaker assumption that ( )XpDY |0 ⊥  to remove the bias 
because ( )( )XpDYE ,0|0 =  is estimable from the sample and only ( )( )XpDYE ,1|0 = is 
unknown. As a result, given a population of units indexed by i , if the propensity score 
( )iXp  is known, the ATT can be estimated as follows:  
( ) ( ){ }1|0,|1,|| 011 ==−=== iiiiiiiD DDXYEDXYEEτ  
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( )( ) ( )( ){ }1|0,|1,| 01 ==−== iiiiiii DDXpYEDXpYEE           (9) 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of ( )1| =ii DX  for the first expression 
and  ( )( )1| =ii DXp  for the second expression.  
      Matching on propensity scores provides a way to overcome the curse of the 
dimensionality, but for it to work well samples have to be adequately large. If treatment and 
control units are matched based on nearest propensity score, it is possible that matches occur 
between individuals with quite different treatment outcomes even though they have the same 
propensity scores (Zhao, 2004).  To rule out the possibility of mismatching problems, the 
balancing property and sufficiently large sample sizes are required to generate high quality 
PSM estimates.  
In contrast, the sample selection treatment effect model (Goldberger, 1972;Greene, 1993) 
is an alternative parametric method to identify the income effect through conditional 
regression. The model assumes the joint normal distribution between the underlying 
disturbances of the Logistic equation regarding the decision to accept or to reject a contract 
and the treatment equation in which the income impact is specified. As discussed in the 
introduction, this approach accounts for the fact that unobservable variables may be 
correlated with both the operators’ decision to contract and farm income. Accounting for this 
fact allows for an unbiased estimate of the impact of contracting on income. The treatment 
effects approach is used here rather than an instrumental variables approach because there are 
too few variables available with which to construct an instrument to use with the contracting 
dummy variable.  
      Let the latent variable *iZ reflect the net benefits to a small landholder from participating 
in contracts compared to independent production and marketing: 
iii uwZ +′= γ*                                                             (10) 
Let 1=iZ  if 0* >iZ  and 0=iZ  otherwise. The vector iw  denotes the vector of explanatory 
covariates consisting of farmer si'  characteristics. If the latent variable is positive the 
dummy variable indicating contracting iZ  equals one and zero otherwise. The interest in 
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terms of inference is on the second regression equation that measures the impact of a 
production contract on a farmer’s income iy :  
iiii Zxy ετβ +⋅+′=                                                      (11) 
where the vector ix  plays the analogous role as iw  and they may be identical. A linear 
relationship between contract participation and income is assumed and the coefficient τ  
measures the magnitude of contract impact. In contrast with matching methods this 
assumption is not necessary to produce the ATT estimates.  
We cannot simply run estimation on equation (11) because the decision to contract may 
be affected by unobservable variables that may also influence income level. If this is the case, 
the disturbance terms in equation (10) and (11) will be correlated, resulting in biased 
estimates of τ . To correct the bias, we make the assumption that the error terms have a joint 
normal distribution with the following form: 
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      By combining both equations we are able to derive the expected income in the treatment 
group that contracts as follows:  
[ ] [ ]1|1| =++′== iiiii ZExZyE ετβ  
     
( )
( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′Φ
′++′=
i
i
i w
w
x γ
γφρστβ                                    (12) 
      For non-participants in the control group, the counterpart to (12) is:   
[ ] [ ]0|0| =+′== iiiii ZExZyE εβ  
                             
( )
( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
′Φ−
′−+′=
i
i
i w
w
x γ
γφρσβ
1
                                 (13) 
      Equation (12) suggests that ignoring the last term 
( )
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w
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γφ
 in an ordinary least squares 
regression would lead to an omitted variable bias in estimates of β  and τ . To produce the 
unbiased parameter estimates the Heckman’s two-step procedure turns out to be a variable 
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strategy. The net result will be a different estimate of τ  that will account for the self-selected 
nature of contract participation. The difference in expected earnings between participants and 
non-participants is then,  
[ ] [ ] ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Φ−Φ+==−= ii
i
iiii ZyEZyE 1
0|1|
φρστ                       (14) 
If the selectivity correction term is omitted from the least squares regression, then this 
difference is what is estimated by the least squares coefficient on the treatment dummy 
variable. If the correlation coefficient ρ  is positive, we will see that least squares 
overestimate the treatment effect.  
2.2 Matching algorithms and Heckman’s two-step procedure 
      Estimation of ATT using matching is accomplished in two steps. First, we need to 
estimate the propensity score for each unit in the treated and control groups. The logistic 
probability model is adopted, but other standard models will yield similar results. The critical 
issue in the first step is that the balancing property must be achieved when determining what 
pretreatment covariates to include in the logit model. After estimating the propensity score, 
for any given specification, sample observations are divided into strata based on the 
estimated propensity score. Then whether pretreatment covariates are balanced within each 
stratum is examined. We use tests for the statistical significance of differences in the 
distribution of covariates, focusing on first and second moments as in Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1984).  
      In the second step, a class of matching algorithms suggested in Rosenbaum and Rubin’s 
article can be used to pair treated units and control units. Because the probability of 
observing two units with exactly the same value of the propen1sity score is in principle zero 
given ( )xp  is a continuous variable, matching on the propensity score is essentially a 
weighting strategy in that we need determine what weights are placed on comparison units at 
each level of p when computing the estimated treatment effect. The estimator takes the 
general form: 
( )∑ ∑
∩∈ ∈
= ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
PSIi iIj
jiT YjiWYn 1 0
01
1
1 ,ˆ
1|τ                                  (15) 
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where 1I  is the set of treatment observations, 1n  the number of units in the treatment group, 
iI 0  is the set of comparison observations matched to treatment unit i , PS  denotes the region 
of common support, and ( )jiW ,ˆ  are weights that depend upon the distance between the 
propensity scores for i  and j .  
      To reduce the estimation variance and improve the matching quality, we match here with 
replacement. In cases with very large sample sizes, one may consider matching without 
replacement without as much concern for variance and matching quality. Among the large 
stock of matching algorithms, nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching are two 
methods most commonly applied, partly from considerations of convenience. Brief 
illustrations on these two alternatives are presented next.  
      Nearest neighbor matching is frequently used due to ease of implementation, in which a 
unique alternative individual with the closest propensity score serves as counterfactual for the 
treated unit unless there are multiple nearest neighbors. Since we lose control of the distance 
between treated unit and its paired individual, a low quality estimate is likely to be generated 
when a large gap of propensity score is observed. Instead of finding one nearest neighbor, 
matching on the nearest k  neighbors is sometimes used with the same weight put on each 
paired unit. It is essentially the tradeoff between reduced variance and increased bias. Nearest 
neighbor matching sets are defined as follows: 
                                         ( ) ⎩⎨
⎧=
0
1
,ˆ jiW   
otherwise
PPj
Ik
ki
0
ˆˆminarg
∈
−=
                                      (16) 
      In caliper matching, all the control units with estimated propensity scores falling within a 
radius c  from iPˆ  are matched to the treated unit i . Those treated individuals, for whom no 
matches can be found, are discarded from the analysis. Caliper matching set are defined as 
follows:  
( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
0
1
,ˆ injiW   otherwise
cPP ji <− ˆˆ                                             (17) 
where in  denotes number of caliper matches for i .  
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      To estimate the sample selection treatment effect model, Heckman’s two-step procedure 
turns out to be a good approach to follow. The first step in Heckman’s procedure estimates a 
Probit model based on the discrete variable:  
⎩⎨
⎧=
0
1
iZ                               
ii
ii
wu
wu
γ
γ
′−<
′−≥
                             (18) 
      Maximum likelihood estimates from the first stage provide consistent estimates for γ  in 
a normalized term. These can in turn be used to construct consistent estimators for the 
additional term in the second stage OLS estimation. For each observation in the selected 
sample, we compute 
( )
( )i
i
i w
w
γ
γφλ ′Φ
′=
ˆ
ˆˆ  and ( )iiii wγλλδ ˆˆˆˆ += , where ( )Φ  is the cumulative 
normal distribution function and ( )φ  is the density function.  
      In the second stage, we can just use the treated group observations and follow the 
regression equation (12) to obtain the estimates for τ , β  and ρσβλ =  by the OLS method. 
Since we have observations for both treated group and control group, the alternative 
approach we can adopt is to run OLS regression on both equation (12) and (13) with all 
available observations. We can then obtain a consistent estimator for 2σ  using 
22 ˆ1ˆ λβδσ +′= een                                                        (19) 
where e is a vector of estimated residuals and ∑
=
=
n
i
in 1
ˆ1ˆ δδ . Finally, an estimate of 2ρ  is 
computed as 2
2
2
ˆ
ˆ σ
βρ λ=  which provides a complete set of estimates of the model’s parameters. 
This two-stage procedure generates consistent estimates, albeit not efficient. Efficient 
parameter estimates using maximum likelihood estimation can be jointly obtained by 
maximizing the corresponding log-likelihood function after reparameterizing:  
( ) ( )∑ ∑= = ′−−−+−Φ= 0 1 2212log21logloglog Z Z iii xYqL νθπθ                                                  
( )[ ]21log ωνθω ++′−Φ+ iii qxY                                                                                           (20) 
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where ii wq γ ′= , σθ 1= , [ ] στβν /,=  and 21 ρρω −= .  
3.  Data 
Farm-level data were collected through a survey conducted by more than 60 
undergraduate rural-area students from Zhejiang University in China when they returned to 
their home villages during the winter break in February 2004. As we did not receive 
responses from a large enough number of volunteers, the distribution of regions that the 
farmers come from across the China cannot be considered to be approximately random. As a 
result more data were collected in Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Shangdong provinces since many of 
the student volunteers came from these three provinces. In total, the farmers included in the 
survey represent over 13 provinces and 47 counties.  The survey contained questions on the 
farm household, farm production status and involvement in contract farming. Student survey 
enumerators were carefully trained before the time they returned home. All of them had the 
ability to explain each item on the survey form to local growers. Each student randomly 
selected 30 households in their home village to interview. Even though contract farming is 
becoming prevalent in production processes for some goods, contracts are still rarely adopted 
in some regions for a specified commodity.  
The students returned 1820 surveys of which 1036 were complete and usable. Further, 
one observation with extremely large land size, 60 hectares compared to 0.48 hectares on 
average operated by farmers in the sample, was thrown away because it might not be a 
typical farm; farms of that size are not of interest to our study. In the whole sample we 
obtained 1035 usable observations. Two filtering criteria are applied further for our purpose. 
First, farmers whose proportion of agricultural income is less than 10 percent of total income 
are considered as non-farmer oriented businesses and are excluded from the sample. Second, 
we eliminated 30 observations reporting incomes per laborer greater than 20,000 Yuan. This 
income level is 7 times the average responded income of 3,000 Yuan. Several reasons justify 
our decision to remove the observations from the sample. First, the observations are so much 
greater than average we cannot rule out a data recording issue. If we divide income by farm 
size for these observations, we will get something much closer to other farmers’ income per 
laborer. Second, the initial goal of China’s contract farming program is to raise small farm 
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income. So we are more concerned with the economic impact on small farms of contract 
farming. In addition, these unusually large farms have a variety of income sources other than 
contracting income, and their production characteristics are significantly different from small 
farms. The last, all of these observations are found to be contract participants. In the 
propensity score matching method, these observations would potentially reduce the matching 
quality, because their counterparts cannot be found in the control group. After these two steps, 
the overall sample has 905 valid observations; we label this sample as Sample 1.   
      Farmers involved in the survey can be classified into three groups: farmers who have 
contracts, farmers who decide not to contract given contract opportunities and farmers who 
do not have the opportunity to access contracts. For the third group of farmers, they are 
excluded from having contracts and do not need to make a decision to contract or not to 
contract based on their anticipated gain in net profit. A variety of underlying reasons might 
account for the exclusion, such as regional development status and product category not 
consistent with contract arrangement. For the sample selection model, we rule this group of 
growers out and only concentrate on the first two groups of growers. The first two groups 
from sample 1 account for 522 valid households. This sub-sample is treated as sample 2 in 
our context. However, when implementing the propensity score matching methods we had 
better treat the third group of farmers as non-contractees and thereby obtain more comparison 
units in the control group for the purpose of improving matching quality.  In order to do that, 
the additional assumption has to be made that this type of farmers would reject the contacting 
offer if such an offer were available. Finally, we note that the contracts studied in the context 
are within a very wide range and include contracts for vegetable, fishery, dairy and hog 
production, and are not limited just in one type of product. So the farmers are quite 
heterogeneous far with respect to production and income characteristics. To make income per 
labor more comparable among different farmers, one option is to focus on food and vegetable 
production only, the sectors that dominate the agriculture industry in China. As a result, we 
have 665 and 376 farmers, who are more homogeneous producers than in Sample 1 and 
Sample 2, left in Sample 3 and Sample 4. The Sample 4 only involves growers who decide to 
accept or reject contracts under the same production type, whereas the remaining growers 
without access to contracts are stilled contained in Sample 3. To further refine our data, we 
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remove those farmers who report land size as zero and those whose majority income comes 
from sources other than agricultural production.   
      One limitation of our survey data is the missing information regarding the cost and 
investment in the production. Since it is hard for Chinese farmers to identify the labor cost 
and some other operating costs, only gross income for the household was collected in the 
survey. As a result, we have to use the gross income as the proxy for the net farm income to 
assess the income effect. Therefore, the income effect tends to be overestimated to some 
degree. Nonetheless, our data, in the pilot study stage to assess the welfare effects of contract 
farming program in China, will still work in the comparison of income effects using different 
methods to remove selection bias. Marketing contracts and production contracts are two 
forms of contracts widely adopted by the growers.  
Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics of the three samples. Tests for equality of 
means and proportions between contract and non-contract farming in the three samples are 
reported. The average means of covariates for the treatment and control group and the test 
results tend to have the same magnitude and significance in the three samples. The table 
highlights a couple of striking differences between the two groups. Contracting growers are 
slightly younger and more educated than independent growers, but the disparities are not 
significant in our sample. The average size of contract farmers is almost twice than that of 
independent farmers in Sample 2, 3 and 4 and 1.5 times in Sample 1; these differences are 
statistically based on their t statistics. Farmers under contract treatment have income on 
average 2,000 Chinese Yuan (one dollar is approximately 8.2 Yuan) higher than those who 
decide not to contract in the three samples, and this simple mean difference seems to be fairly 
important and statistically significant. The result also strongly indicates that the regions 
where contracts are used are more likely to be supported by some government policies. 
Among the three geographical regions in which the sample comes from, contracting is 
significantly more commonly used in the Eastern and Western regions than independent 
production. Contracts are seldom found in the central region’s production process. Generally 
speaking, the Eastern and Central regions are traditionally more developed agriculturally than 
is the Western. But the Western area is now receiving numerous beneficial policies, such as 
tax reduction, fundamental construction appropriation and investment encouragement, under 
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a priority program driven by the central government. The contract-farming program is 
supported by the local government as well. The simple comparison of means provides us the 
evidence that the use of contract farming is dependent on regional agricultural development 
status. The distribution of other covariates, such as price fluctuation and market distance, for 
the contract and independent groups are not significantly differentiated.  
4. Results 
4.1 Contract participation and propensity scores 
Both the matching method and the sample selection model involve estimation of two 
equations.  Of course, the two methods use the results of a choice model for different 
purposes. The first estimation result allows the matching method to create propensity scores, 
whereas it is used in the selection model to construct the additional adjustment covariates 
used to remove the bias. Table 2 illustrates the results of three commonly used models, 
namely the linear, Probit and Logit models, applied to three samples to predict the contract 
decision. The linear probability model is often criticized because of its poor prediction power, 
but it is used in our context for the purpose of comparison.  
Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained for the three models. The coefficient signs 
are strictly consistent among three models within each sample.  All three samples indicate 
that both the production size and its squared term are the most important covariates in 
explaining the farmer’s contract decision. The large-scale farmers are more likely to join 
contract production rather than independent production along with a decreasing trend after a 
certain amount of size. The younger farmers are associated with significantly higher 
participation possibility in Sample 1 and 2. Well-educated farmers would independently take 
advantage of their own production resources and local markets to sell their products. We 
expected farmers facing wider fluctuations of marker prices and a greater distance to target 
markets to be more likely to exercise contracts in order to reduce the price risk and marketing 
risk. However, all four samples present estimates other things being equal of the inverse 
effects of these two market characteristics, but at non-significant statistical levels.   
Having a higher education level and the availability of government support seems to have 
an inconclusive impact on the likelihood of whether to contract. A negative effect of 
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education and positive effect of government support are found in Samples 1, 3 and 4, 
whereas opposite results occur in Sample 2.  
Compared with farmers in Western region, other things being equal, an operation being 
located in the Central region significantly reduces the likelihood of contracting in Sample 1, 
2 and 4. The insignificant impact occurs for Sample 3. But an Eastern farmer shows an 
insignificantly higher propensity to have contracts except in Sample 1. Because farmers in 
Central regions are historically focusing predominantly on rice and grain production, it is 
relatively difficult for them to convert to producing other commodities even in the presence 
of contracts. To achieve the national food security the China central government currently 
still controls the supply system of major grains, such as rice and wheat, even though the 
demand side has been completely market oriented. Most growers in the Central region have 
to fulfill a certain amount of specified products required by the local government. Otherwise, 
they must pay an amount of indemnification due to violating the government regulation. If 
the violation fee is large enough, farmers will reject the contracts and follow the 
government’s production plan. Production regulation in the well-developed Eastern region is 
often less restricted so that growers in the Eastern region have more of a chance to use 
contracts to organize production.    
We often use the Logistic estimation results to calibrate propensity scores for the 
matching model. In the meanwhile, the Probit estimation results are used to construct the bias 
term in Heckman’s second step. The region of common support is the interval of propensity 
scores that are represented in both the control and treatment units.  The common support 
region for Sample 1 is [ ]73.0,04.0  and excludes only two control units. Similarly, only one 
control observation is found outside of the common support region[ ]91.0,05.0  in Sample 2 
and [ ]800.0,033.0  in Sample 3, and only two control observations are outside the Sample 4 
region of [ ]95.0,04.0 . After dropping these outlier observations, the histograms of the 
estimated propensity scores for Sample 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1 and 2. A quick 
inspection on three figures reveals the common feature of the contract and noncontract 
groups: most comparison units have propensity scores concentrated within the first half range 
of [ ]5.0,1.0 . When comparing the histogram bins for the large propensity score values, 
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particularly greater than 0.5, we find that the number of comparison units in upper bins is less 
than the number of treated units in lower bins for Sample 2.  In Samples 1 and 3, however, 
this is only the case for the last two bins, those with score values greater than 0.7.  In other 
words, very few of the comparison units are able to be comparable to the treated units having 
larger propensity scores in three samples. Matching results in the Sample 2 might be worse 
than those in the Sample 1 and 3 due to Sample 2’s largest interval covering the mismatching. 
As a consequence, the matching quality is expected to be reduced when pairing the treatment 
observations that are more likely to be involved in the contract-farming program. This 
mismatching problem could be exacerbated if matching without replacement were 
implemented. 
4.2 Sample selection model treatment effect results 
In spite of its expected poor performance due to bias, the simple linear regression without 
any bias correction may provide us a benchmark in order to see how the other two methods 
change and improve the basic results. The simple linear regression estimates and the sample 
selection treatment effect results using Heckman’s two-step procedure and maximum 
likelihood estimation in four samples are reported in the Table 3. The biased estimates in the 
linear regression suggest that the significant positive effects of farming size, market distance 
and central region on the improvement of household’s per labor income. They are consistent 
with our initial expectation. The market price has a non-significant, but negative impact on 
farm income in all four samples from the biggest impact in Sample 3 to the smallest impact 
in Sample 1. The overall marginal effects associated with contract production are relatively 
small in four samples. More specifically, the income effect of contract participation is 
positively significant in Sample 1, 2 and 3 in that contracting farmers on average have above 
3 percent more per labor agricultural earnings taking the log values than those in independent 
production. The income improvement in Sample 4 drops to 2.2 percent and is at a non-
significant level. In addition, we find that both the sample size and its squared term play a 
very important role in driving results in the linear regression model and the sample selection 
model. Other covariates, such as age, education level and region, do not significantly 
influence the farmer’s per labor income.  
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The sample selection treatment effect model used to remove the selection bias produces 
substantially different results for all four samples in both estimation methods. The 
Heckman’s two-step procedure tends to produce absolutely larger and more significant 
negative effect for contract production than maximum likelihood estimates, even thought 
both contracting estimates are insignificant. The estimated significant positive value for the 
correlation coefficient ρ  suggests the overestimation of treatment effect in each case. The 
bias-corrected income effects under the treatment effect model arise even to be reversed to 
the insignificant negative level in contrast with the linear regression, whereas other 
covariates almost keep the same impact on the per labor income. It indicates the selection 
bias does exist and drives the results a lot. The simple regression results might be misleading 
if we ignore the selection bias. If we only compare results between simple regression and 
MLE estimates, we find that the treatment effects of contract farming drop from 5.8% to –
1.8% and 3.1% to -1.0% respectively in the Sample 1 and 2. The largest gap of treatment 
effect occurs in the Sample 3 with 3% versus –1.61%. The homogeneous growers in the 
Sample 4 have the smallest treatment effect as low as –0.1%.   
The simple regression and sample selection treatment effect model fits the Sample 4 well 
in terms of the adjusted R2 and log-likelihood values. Due to the homogeneity among 
growers, we have expected the last sample to produce best-quality estimation results and 
more powerful implication for assessing income effect of contract farming program. The 
homogeneous production in our context mainly refers to the crop production and other highly 
substituted crop production, such as vegetable and fruit production. The parameter estimates 
and their p-values are very similar between Heckman’s two-step procedure and MLE 
estimation. So it is sensible to make conclusions based on MLE results. The several findings 
can be summarized here. First, the contract participation did not enhance per labor earnings 
at all, but it even hurts the farmer’s benefits. However, only very weak evidence is found for 
this opposite effect. Second, the standard deviation Sigma for the error term in the second 
regression equation is around 0.9, significantly different from zero. The correlation 
coefficient Rho between the selection equation and regression equation takes significant 
value of 0.36, indicating that the overestimation takes place for direct regression without any 
bias correction. In addition, the result provides us with strong evidence that being a large-
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scale farmer positively raises income per labor after controlling for individual, regional and 
farm-level characteristics, in a large part due to the dominance of the production efficiency 
and reduced transaction costs. The coefficient estimates of squared term of land size are tiny 
in all samples, but highly significant. The farmers with access to remote market are likely to 
make higher earnings than those targeting local market. Government support strongly raises 
the income, suggesting the effectiveness of public policy in contract farming program. Other 
covariates almost remain the same in terms of their impacts on the response variable when 
compared with the simple linear regression. Finally, when allowing for all types of 
production like in the Sample 1, contract production becomes even more harmful for growers. 
The greater gross income dominated in other non-contracting industries, such as the fishery 
and dairy products, may account for the deterioration.  
4.3 Propensity score matching treatment effect results 
Nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching specified in Section II are applied 
respectively to four samples. In addition, we can estimate the selection model based on the 
Sample 2, and then predict the propensity scores for the Sample 1 to run matching work. The 
same procedure applies to the Sample 3 and 4. The potential gain in this way will be the 
more accurate estimates of the propensity scores because the growers who are not offered 
contracts are excluded from participation decision. This procedure will provide us more 
control units with quality-improved propensity scores in doing matching. As a result, two 
extended cases, labeled as the Sample 1+2 and Sample 3+4, are considered in our matching 
work as well. The matching results are reported in Table 6 and 7.  
      The nearest neighbor matching results allow us to examine carefully the matched pairs 
from the lowest propensity score to the greatest. Graphs depicting the estimated propensity 
scores in an ascending order for matched pairs are presented in Figure 3 to Figure 8 for all six 
cases. For each case the upper part figure contains two propensity score curves representing 
the treatment group and the control group. The virtually complete large overlap between the 
two lines indicates that treated units are well matched to their comparison group counterparts 
in all samples. The lower part figure provides the score difference between matched pairs. As 
was observed using histograms, especially for large propensity score values, nearest neighbor 
matching in Sample 1 works better than that in other three samples, particularly for those 
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treatment units with relatively high propensity scores. After adding two alternative matching 
cases, the best nearest matching quality goes to Sample1+2. The most outstanding distinction 
in propensity scores between the two groups can be found in the region from 0.7 to 0.9 in 
Figure B2 and B5. This suggests that the poorest nearest neighbor matching occurs in Sample 
2 and Sample 4. Nearest neighbor matching works satisfactorily well in other cases. The 
overlap means that other matching algorithms, such as caliper matching, also should work 
well, but will be affected similarly by the upper tail of the propensity score distributions 
where there is less complete overlap.   
      Furthermore, we examined the balance on multivariate covariates in each case using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Chi-Square null deviance tests. The null hypothesis for the 
KS test is of equal balance in the estimated probabilities between treated and control groups.  
Test results after matching, reported in the Table 4 and 5, turn out to be satisfactory except in 
Sample 2 and Sample 3+4 in the sense that most imbalances are eliminated through matching. 
Most matching methods in the Sample 2 and Sample 3+4 fails to achieve balance, given their 
very small p values. In summary, the matching methods are appropriate for use in drawing 
conclusions about the average treatment effect on the treated for other matching cases. But 
the matching results are inconclusive in the Sample 2 and Sample 3+4 due to its balance 
violation.  
      The causal effect of contract farming turns out to be consistent in terms of matching 
methods (nearest neighbor and caliper matching) within each case, except in Sample 2. The 
large discrepancy of treatment effect in Sample 2, about 360Yuan under nearest matching 
and above 1300Yuan using caliper matching, is partly due to the violation of balance 
property, causing the poor performance of matching methods. Including all types of farmers, 
Sample 1 and Sample 1+2 produce almost the same matching results in terms of magnitude 
and significance of income effect. The growers under contract production could make about 
870Yuan higher earnings than those independent producers using the nearest neighbor 
matching method, but neither result are statistically significant in 95 percent confidence 
interval. In contrast, the treatment effects under caliper matching goes up to more than 
1000Yuan in a very significant level, much greater than those under nearest neighbor 
matching. Only a little variation in estimates arises when different calipers are used for these 
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two cases. Estimates range from 1009Yuan to 1127Yuan in Sample 1 and from 1045Yuan to 
1236Yaun in Sample 1+2. Generally speaking, the new prediction procedure in cases Sample 
1+2 does not shift the matching results very much.   
      The foregoing matching results could be misleading to some extent because different 
types of contracts have different production characteristics and gross income levels. For an 
instance, it is not fair to match a hog contract producer with a tea non-contract producer. To 
assess the income effect of contract production on the same basis, we could limit our 
observations within the same production type. For homogeneous growers in our context, who 
heavily depend on land use, in Sample 3, Sample 4 and Sample 3+4, matching results are 
presented in Table 6. The income effect using nearest matching method in each case is 
positive, albeit insignificant. Adding analogous growers without access to contracts, Sample 
3 produces the larger and more significant average treatment effect than Sample 4 in both 
matching algorithms. Matching results seem stable in these two samples, in the range of 
about 1000 Yuan and 700 Yuan, respectively. But we cannot find strong support for the 
positive income effect based on matching results in Sample 4. To adjust the radius of the 
caliper intervals value does not shift the matching results very much for these three cases.  
Due to its violation of balance property, we cannot expect the alternative procedure used in 
Sample 3+4 to provide us important insights regarding income effect.  
The sample selection treatment effect model leads to weak evidence for the slightly 
negative income effects, but propensity score matching methods in all cases produce positive 
income effects. Because different selection bias was removed and strict linear model 
relations are assumed between gross income and other covariates, estimates in the treatment 
effect model are conservative and weak for each sample. It indicates that contract-farming 
program has little impact on the gross income. On contrast, treatment effect estimates from 
the matching methods turn out to strongly positive, particularly for heterogeneous groups in 
Sample 1 and Sample 1+2 and homogeneous growers in Sample 3. Those estimates range 
from 860Yuan to 1200Yuan in heterogeneous groups, although the range of fluctuation is 
narrower, from 920Yuan to 1140Yuan, in Sample 3. To neglect those growers without 
chance to access contract markets does not seem to improve estimates based on score 
matching results. But sample selection treatment effect model and PSM method tend to 
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produce one of the common results, namely income effects are not statistically significant for 
homogeneous growers who made participation decisions in Sample 4. In this sense, estimates 
using both methods are consistent, providing us weak evidence that contract production is 
likely to bring higher earnings to growers. In other words our results did not present strong 
positive income effects associated with the contract-farming program implemented in China.  
      One critical issue remains to be addressed in future data collection efforts.  The critical 
issue regarding the estimation results in both the selection treatment model and semi-
parametric PSM concerns the limited information available on the response variable.   In this 
study, we have only the total per laborer income information rather than the net household 
income. We have to subtract the production cost and investment cost from the total revenue 
when we try to calibrate the net margin of each grower. But we cannot obtain the production 
cost and investment information from the survey data. A couple of biased factors might occur 
with using gross income as a proxy variable. On one hand, the overall income effects tend to 
be overestimated due to larger magnitude of total income. On the other hand, for those 
growers exercising production contract treatment effects are likely to be underestimated 
based on matching method. This is because production costs such as input and technology, in 
some cases, will be mainly provided by the contractors according to the production contracts. 
If this is true, the collected gross income for these growers should reflect their true net 
income. Matching them with their corresponding control units with gross income, treatment 
estimates will be biased and underestimated. As a result, the total income might be a coarse 
substitute for the net margin because the high total income does not necessarily result in the 
high net margin. It is an obviously not optimal to assess the income effect by using the total 
income measure. This drawback potentially could account as well for the relatively poor 
estimation power of sample selection treatment effect model. It also could contribute to the 
weak robustness of PSM method in the sense that different specifications tend to cause 
different treatment effect results. In the future follow-up study, this missing part should be 
filled carefully in order to produce more accurate inference on income effects of contract 
farming.  
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Table 1. Sample Means, Standard Errors and Tests of Equality of Variables 
    Sample 1     Sample 2     Sample 3     Sample 4   
Variables Treatment Control t-test  Treatment Control t-test  Treatment Control t-test Treatment Control t-test 
I. Farmer Attributes       
      Age 45.04(0.68) 46.13(0.37) -1.41 45.04(0.68) 46.42(0.28) -1.55 46.05(0.93) 46.17(0.43) -0.12 46.05(0.93) 46.36(0.68) -0.27 
      Education 2.44(0.07) 2.43(0.04) 0.19 2.44(0.07) 2.28(0.06) 1.84 2.43(0.08) 2.40(0.04) 0.35 2.43(0.08) 2.29(0.06) 1.33 
II. Operation Scale       
      Size 0.96(0.13) 0.65(0.07) 2.09 0.96(0.13) 0.52(0.04) 3.26 1.11(0.16) 0.59(0.05) 3.09 1.11(0.16) 0.51(0.04) 3.65 
      Income 0.46(0.03) 0.29(0.01) 4.59 0.46(0.03) 0.28(0.02) 4.35 0.45(0.04) 0.25(0.01) 4.52 0.45(0.04) 0.24(0.02) 4.49 
III. External Market       
      Price 0.21(0.01) 0.2(0.01) 0.93 0.21(0.01) 0.19(0.01) 1.32 0.2(0.02) 0.19(0.07) 0.83 0.2(0.02) 0.19(0.01) 0.83 
      Distance 0.34(0.03) 0.38(0.02) -0.94 0.34(0.03) 0.34(0.03) 0.1 0.43(0.05) 0.40(0.02) 0.62 0.43(0.05) 0.34(0.03) 1.71 
      Support 0.65(0.03) 0.45(0.02) 5.22 0.65(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 4.54 0.71(0.04) 0.40(0.02) 6.76 0.71(0.04) 0.39(0.03) 6.19 
IV. Region       
      East 0.69(0.03) 0.5(0.02) 5.2 0.69(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 5.65 0.74(0.04) 0.45(0.02) 6.49 0.74(0.04) 0.4(0.03) 6.83 
      Central 0.15(0.03) 0.35(0.02) -6.62 0.15(0.03) 0.44(0.03) -7.76 0.17(0.03) 0.39(0.02) -5.59 0.17(0.03) 0.49(0.03) -7.12 
      West 0.46(0.03) 0.15(0.01) 0.29 0.16(0.03) 0.11(0.02) 1.52 0.09(0.03) 0.16(0.03) -2.31 0.09(0.03) 0.11(0.02) -0.46 
Sample Size 196 709   196 326   121 544   121 255   
  a. All data are from a 2004 survey of rural farmers in 13 provinces of China. Sample 1 has 905 observations. Sample 2 has 522 observations. Sample has 
665 observations. Sample 4 has 376 observations. The complete sample included 1036 units. Restrictions of samples are described in the text.  
   b. The number in the parenthesis is the standard error.  
   c. Age measures years of oldness for the master labor in each household. Education represents levels of master’s education, with 1 for no any education, 2 
for elementary level, 3 for middle school level and 4 for higher level. Land size is based on numbers of hectares.  
   d. Income is based on multiples of 10,000 Yuan, the Chinese monetary unit, where one dollar is about 8.2 Yuan.  
   e. Price measures the price fluctuation degree for the product.  
       f. Distance is dummy variable with 0 for local market and 1 for far-reached market. Support is also dummy variable with 1 representing the presence  
       of government support policy for contract farming program.  
       g. East, central and west are three location dummies.   
    h. The t-values are computed by Satterthwaite’s method with the unequal variance assumption to examine the mean difference 
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Table 2: Contract Decisions: Linear Probability, Probit and Logit Models 
    
Sample 
1     
Sample 
2     
Sample 
3     
Sample 
4   
Variables Linear Probit Logit Linear Probit Logit Linear Probit Logit Linear Probit Logit 
Constant 0.42  -0.05 0.02  0.69  0.55  1.01  0.24  -0.67 -1.05 0.48  0.06  0.23  
 0.00  0.86  0.97  0.00  0.14  0.10  0.01  0.07  0.12  0.00  0.90  0.77  
Age 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 
 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.19  0.23  0.19  0.10  0.11  0.08  
Education -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.15 
 0.31  0.29  0.28  0.87  0.87  0.94  0.32  0.20  0.24  0.34  0.29  0.28  
Size 0.05  0.27  0.48  0.12  0.34  0.61  0.11  0.39  0.64  0.20  0.58  1.01  
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Size2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01  -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 
 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.03  
Price -0.09 -0.32 -0.61 -0.06 -0.16 -0.32 -0.13  -0.47 -0.85 -0.15 -0.44 -0.71 
 0.30  0.32  0.27  0.63  0.68  0.62  0.16  0.22  0.20  0.28  0.33  0.35  
Distance -0.06 -0.23 -0.41 -0.06 -0.15 -0.28 -0.04  -0.19 -0.34 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 
 0.04  0.03  0.03  0.20  0.24  0.18  0.18  0.16  0.14  0.60  0.65  0.56  
Support 0.09  0.32  0.55  -0.04 -0.12 -0.19 0.14  0.58  0.10  0.08  0.24  0.44  
 0.08  0.09  0.10  0.68  0.66  0.67  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.42  0.48  0.46  
East -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 0.03  0.11  0.18  0.02  0.04  0.12  0.07  0.18  0.26  
 0.67  0.56  0.56  0.75  0.71  0.72  0.79  0.89  0.83  0.59  0.65  0.71  
Central -0.15 -0.63 -1.17 -0.33 -0.98 -1.67 -0.07  -0.32 -0.59 -0.21 -0.75 -1.33 
  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.13  0.14  0.01  0.00  0.00  
a. The first row for each covariate is the coefficient estimate.  
b. The second row is the p-value for each estimate.  
c. The response variable is the contract participation dummy variable.   
d. Size2 represents the squared term of Size.   
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Table 3: Linear Regression, Sample Selection Treatment Model Estimation Results 
Control                            R2  or Percentage
Sample Age Age2 Edu Size Size2 Price Distance Support East Contract Sigma Rho Loglike Increase 
Sample 1:    
   OLS -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.25 -0.54 -0.04 0.29 0.15 -0.13 0.28 - - 0.31  0.058 
   P-value 0.44 0.52 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.23 0.37 0.00 - -   
   Two-Step  -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.19 -0.01 -0.08 0.36 0.04 -0.09 -1.50 1.07  0.67  0.31  -0.231 
   P-value 0.49 0.47 0.62 0.00 0.03 0.76 0.00 0.80 0.55 0.05 0.04  0.03    
   MLE -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.24 -0.01 -0.07 0.33 0.11 -0.14 -0.13 1.00  0.48  -1671.96 -0.018 
   P-value 0.55 0.61 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.00  0.00    
Sample 2:               
   OLS -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.55 -0.05 -0.12 0.40 0.35 -0.39 0.22 - - 0.38  0.031 
   P-value 0.48 0.68 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.02 - -   
   Two-Step  -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.75 -0.06 -0.23 0.31 0.29 -0.33 -1.39 1.18  0.82  0.38  -0.178 
   P-value 0.34 0.72 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.30 0.02  0.03    
   MLE -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.55 -0.47 -0.20 0.44 0.36 -0.42 -0.06 1.00  0.51  -1006.71 -0.010 
   P-value 0.56 0.73 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.61 0.00  0.00    
Sample 3:      
   OLS -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.48 -0.03 -0.27 0.13 0.11 -0.10 0.21 - - 0.36  0.030 
   P-value 0.34 0.42 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.45 0.53 0.03 - -   
   Two-Step  -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.65 -0.04 -0.47 0.07 0.31 -0.07 -1.29 1.05  0.81  0.37  -0.186 
   P-value 0.29 0.42 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.69 0.15 0.01  0.02    
   MLE -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.47 -0.03 -0.29 0.16 0.06 -0.11 -1.11 0.92  0.36  -1154.31 -0.161 
   P-value 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.63 0.52 0.57 0.00  0.02    
Sample 4:      
   OLS -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.63 -0.06 -0.24 0.22 0.43 -0.36 0.15 - - 0.42  0.022 
   P-value 0.60 0.72 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.18 - -   
   Two-Step  -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.67 -0.06 -0.28 0.21 0.45 -0.35 -0.08 0.91  0.15  0.42  -0.011 
   P-value 0.58 0.72 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.95 0.01  0.01    
   MLE -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.63 -0.06 -0.27 0.24 0.42 -0.38 -0.01 0.93  0.36  -696.47 -0.001 
   P-value 0.65 0.75 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.98 0.00  0.03      
  Note: Age2 represents the squared term of Age; Percentage Increase represents the marginal effect of contract participation in terms of log inc 
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Table 6: Sample Means for Matched Control Units within Heterogeneous Samples 
  No. of  No. Of Mean               
 Treatment Control Propensity           Income
Control Sample Units Units Score Age Edu Size Size2 Price Dist. Supp East Central West Effect 
Sample 1:                
Nearest Neighbor 196 196 0.25  44.47 2.37 1.02 5.76 0.22  0.30 0.63 0.65 0.15 0.20 886.95 
   0.10  0.51 0.46 0.69 0.43 0.35  0.41 0.57 0.26 0.96 0.23 0.06 
Caliper (0.01) 174 312 0.23  45.21 2.37 0.72 3.71 0.23  0.28 0.61 0.63 0.15 0.21 1126.70 
   0.08  0.85 0.52 0.72 0.37 0.30  0.18 0.73 0.52 0.73 0.41 0.01 
Caliper (0.02) 180 318 0.24  44.92 2.36 0.82 4.70 0.23  0.29 0.62 0.64 0.15 0.21 1075.20 
   0.08  0.73 0.45 0.55 0.25 0.39  0.33 0.83 0.44 0.73 0.34 0.01 
Caliper (0.03) 184 322 0.24  44.82 2.37 0.86 4.90 0.23  0.29 0.62 0.64 0.15 0.21 1008.70 
   0.08  0.72 0.45 0.42 0.20 0.39  0.40 0.73 0.37 0.96 0.34 0.02 
Sample 2:              
Neareat Neighbor 196 196 0.45  42.79 2.60 0.70 1.87 0.21  0.34 0.69 0.72 0.14 0.15 364.08 
   0.16  0.00 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.79  0.89 0.39 0.57 0.41 0.76 0.56 
Caliper (0.01) 136 190 0.41  44.06 2.53 0.45 0.55 0.22  0.38 0.63 0.66 0.17 0.18 1308.50 
   0.14  0.03 0.28 0.06 0.16 0.51  0.81 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.29 0.00 
Caliper (0.02) 154 209 0.42  43.66 2.54 0.51 1.01 0.21  0.35 0.66 0.68 0.16 0.17 1361.80 
   0.14  0.01 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.73  0.97 0.66 0.86 0.41 0.89 0.00 
Caliper (0.03) 170 225 0.43  43.09 2.59 0.51 0.98 0.21  0.33 0.67 0.69 0.15 0.16 1290.00 
   0.15  0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.83  0.52 0.68 0.76 0.41 0.98 0.01 
Sample 1+2:               
Neareat Neighbor 196 196 0.43  44.80 2.59 0.90 4.03 0.23  0.36 0.63 0.69 0.13 0.18 860.12 
   0.15  0.77 0.14 0.65 0.98 0.27  0.66 0.59 0.99 0.20 0.66 0.07 
Caliper (0.01) 173 369 0.42  44.66 2.57 0.75 3.34 0.22  0.37 0.60 0.67 0.14 0.19 1236.20 
   0.14  0.39 0.27 0.96 0.71 0.44  0.63 0.14 0.50 0.52 0.36 0.00 
Caliper (0.02) 190 386 0.43  44.72 2.61 0.82 3.63 0.23  0.37 0.63 0.70 0.13 0.18 1077.40 
   0.14  0.77 0.11 0.80 0.86 0.40  0.51 0.67 0.89 0.20 0.75 0.01 
Caliper (0.03) 191 387 0.43  44.59 2.61 0.82 3.61 0.23  0.37 0.63 0.69 0.13 0.18 1044.50 
      0.14  0.60 0.11 0.74 0.88 0.34  0.51 0.59 0.99 0.20 0.65 0.02 
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Table 7: Sample Means for Matched Control Units within Homogeneous Samples 
  No. of  No. Of Mean               
 Treatment Control Propensity           Income
Control Sample Units Units Score Age Edu Size Size2 Price Dist. Supp. East Central West Effect 
Sample 3:                
Nearest Neighbor 121 121 0.22  45.91 2.36 0.94 2.53 0.20  0.44 0.72 0.75 0.17 0.09 979.56 
   0.13  0.91 0.51 0.14 0.11 0.72  0.92 0.81 0.79 0.92 0.89 0.07 
Caliper (0.01) 97 172 0.20  45.92 2.39 0.61 0.80 0.19  0.41 0.67 0.71 0.18 0.11 922.23 
   0.10  0.88 0.89 0.59 0.40 0.34  0.96 0.92 0.77 0.92 0.89 0.02 
Caliper (0.02) 108 183 0.21  45.88 2.35 0.64 0.87 0.19  0.42 0.70 0.74 0.16 0.10 974.13 
   0.10  0.78 0.59 0.49 0.35 0.46  0.71 0.78 0.57 0.73 0.89 0.04 
Caliper (0.03) 111 186 0.21  46.14 2.35 0.68 1.03 0.19  0.44 0.70 0.74 0.17 0.09 1143.80 
   0.11  0.77 0.44 0.31 0.24 0.53  0.62 0.78 0.57 0.73 0.89 0.02 
Sample 4:              
Nearest Neighbor 121 121 0.42  45.52 2.39 0.95 3.06 0.19  0.35 0.67 0.71 0.13 0.16 759.13 
   0.20  0.68 0.72 0.17 0.27 0.38  0.22 0.28 0.43 0.08 0.06 0.20 
Caliper (0.01) 69 87 0.34  46.74 2.40 0.41 0.29 0.17  0.36 0.65 0.65 0.20 0.15 568.18 
   0.15  0.72 0.88 0.08 0.12 0.03  0.60 0.41 0.56 0.06 0.66 0.10 
Caliper (0.02) 89 107 0.36  45.58 2.36 0.46 0.46 0.17  0.38 0.64 0.66 0.15 0.09 797.47 
   0.15  0.92 0.73 0.06 0.08 0.05  0.76 1.00 0.81 0.03 0.16 0.05 
Caliper (0.03) 96 114 0.37  46.23 2.37 0.59 1.04 0.19  0.36 0.63 0.68 0.15 0.17 740.22 
   0.17  0.76 0.98 0.43 0.81 0.36  0.87 0.51 0.81 0.03 0.16 0.08 
Sample 3+4:               
Nearest Neighbor 121 121 0.39  45.74 2.39 0.91 2.48 0.20  0.45 0.69 0.75 0.13 0.12 598.81 
   0.19  0.81 0.77 0.06 0.10 0.82  0.78 0.53 0.73 0.08 0.38 0.25 
Caliper (0.01) 85 152 0.34  44.96 2.42 0.46 0.54 0.18  0.35 0.64 0.69 0.16 0.15 807.25 
   0.15  0.70 0.93 0.02 0.05 0.07  0.88 0.63 0.70 0.03 0.38 0.02 
Caliper (0.02) 105 172 0.37  45.26 2.42 0.66 1.23 0.20  0.41 0.67 0.74 0.13 0.13 602.21 
   0.17  0.80 0.94 0.05 0.18 0.68  0.76 0.65 0.52 0.02 0.38 0.17 
Caliper (0.03) 111 178 0.37  45.59 2.42 0.70 1.41 0.20  0.42 0.67 0.74 0.13 0.13 582.72 
      0.18  0.89 0.99 0.08 0.21 0.99  0.88 0.51 0.52 0.02 0.38 0.20 
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        Table 4: Multivariate Tests of Balance for Heterogeneous Samples 
Multivariate   Sample 1     Sample 2     Sample 1+2   
Tests NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03 NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03 NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03
KS Test 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11  0.42 0.37 0.27 0.32  0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 
P-value 0.63 0.36 0.02 0.96  0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00  0.31 0.91 0.30 0.25 
Chi-square 5.27 6.22 7.30 6.48  58.65 14.45 19.24 24.86 5.34 7.26 6.25 6.76 
P-value 0.87 0.78 0.71 0.78  0.00 0.23 0.06 0.01  0.95 0.81 0.91 0.87 
a. NM represents for the nearest matching; 
b. C-0.01 is for caliper matching with 0.01 radius, and C-0.02, C-0.03 are defined the same manner;  
c. P-values for KS test are the bootstrapping p-values based on 1000 repetitions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Multivariate Tests of Balance for Homogeneous Samples 
Multivariate   Sample 3    Sample 4    Sample 3+4   
Tests NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03 NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03 NM C-0.01 C-0.02 C-0.03
KS Test 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.11  0.23 0.22 0.20 0.23  0.15 0.22 0.16 0.16 
P-value 0.78 0.02 0.70 0.39  0.07 0.97 0.57 0.40  0.08 0.06 0.04 0.13 
Chi-square 3.16 1.31 1.70 2.82  6.97 8.27 6.56 4.50  4.95 7.27 4.71 4.91 
P-value 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98  0.86 0.69 0.85 0.96  0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 
a. NM represents for the nearest matching; 
b. C-0.01 is for caliper matching with 0.01 radius, and C-0.02, C-0.03 are defined the same manner;  
c. P-values for KS test are the bootstrapping p-values based on 1000 repetitions. 
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Figure1: Histograms of Propensity Scores for Sample 1 and Sample 2 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Histograms of Propensity Scores for Sample 3 and Sample 4 
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Figure 3: Nearest Matching in Sample 1 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Nearest Matching in Sample 2 
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Figure 5: Nearest Matching in Sample 1+2 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Nearest Matching in Sample 3 
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Figure 7: Nearest Matching in Sample 4 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Nearest Matching in Sample 3+4 
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5. Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, we assessed the income effect of contract farming based on different 
restrictions of the available sample using the treatment effect model from econometrics and 
the propensity score matching method. In large part due to the selection bias associated with 
the survey data, we conclude that the income effect results are not fairly robust across the 
samples by means of the two methods. In order to evaluate the income effect, the total 
income per labor has to be used as the proxy variable for the net income per labor. Mis-
measurement might arise when we evaluate the income effects. Missing information on 
investment amounts in each household also accounts for the poor performance. But the 
available information still allows us to draw a definite conclusion in terms of the income 
effects of contract farming.  
We cannot find evidence from estimates in the sample selection treatment effect model 
that contract production tends to bring higher income to growers than independent production. 
Even worse, contract participation in each sample becomes harmful to rural growers in terms 
of income welfare. Both Heckman’s two-step procedure and MLE confirm the significant 
positive estimates of the correlation coefficient, which leads to the overestimation of income 
effects in the simple regression model without removing any selection bias. However, 
propensity score matching estimates do suggest the presence of the income improvement 
gained from the contract-farming program. The average contract contribution to income 
reaches 1000Yuan in the full Sample 1. As the homogeneous producers are concerned, the 
smaller income effects with reduced significance are found to be averagely 750Yuan in 
Sample 4.  This result is closer to that in the treatment effect model; in the sense we cannot 
find the strong evidence for the income effect.  
A couple of conclusions are drawn regarding the classified samples. The initial purpose 
trying to obtain better estimation and matching results through classification is largely 
achieved. We find that the overall performance of the sample selection treatment effect 
model in Sample 4 is better than that in other samples in terms of adjusted R2 and log-
likelihood values. The smallest gap of percentage increase due to contract between direct 
regression and treatment effect model implies that the refined sample per se removes some 
biases. Even though the largest sample size in Sample 1 and Sample 1+2 contributes to 
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producing the best matching results, they could be misleading. The consistent positive 
income effects are present for homogeneous growers who focus on grain and vegetable 
production in Sample 3. For the homogeneous farmers with the same production 
characteristics, the contracting individual makes a better income than the independent 
individual without contracts, consistently averaging to 1000Yuan. The last refinement in 
Sample 4 produces less income effects, but they are closer to the results using treatment 
effect model.   
Finally, it must be noted that even though income effects are not consistent and robust 
across different samples, the overall performance of both estimation methods turns out to be 
satisfactory. One of our essential goals is to try various estimation tools to examine the 
direction and sensitivity of income impact from the contract participation, based on 
reasonable sub samples. Because different assumptions are made and different selection 
biases are considered to be removed, we cannot simply conclude that one method is superior 
to the other. However, our two classes of estimation methods both indicate that contract-
farming program does not substantially raise income for the homogeneous farmers. 
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CHAPTER 4. FARM SIZE AND CONTRACT 
EXCLUSION IN CHINA 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Contract farming has the potential to improve the welfare of smallholders; however, 
smaller farmers can be excluded from contracts because agribusinesses prefer to award 
contracts to larger, better-off farms. The main goal of this paper is to understand what types 
of barriers or mechanisms prevent small farmers from participation in the contract farming 
program in China. To explore the underlying exclusion mechanism, this paper develops an 
applied contract model that takes into account hidden information and other driving factors. 
Two pricing strategies, common pricing strategy and differentiating pricing strategy, are 
identified in the model. The former strategy offers the same output price in contract, whereas 
the latter provides two sets of lump-sum offers dependent on the output quantities. The 
model demonstrates that the common pricing mechanism, accepted widely by contracting 
firms, could lead to the exclusion of small-scale farmers from the contract production 
program. Two hypotheses have been implied by the conceptual model. Using a unique set of 
spatially sampled farmer and firm survey data, we find that small-scale farmers are more 
likely to be excluded from contract farming in China. Moreover, the common pricing 
strategy appears to be one of the driving factors that have significantly resulted in contract 
exclusion. The primary policy recommendation from this, accordingly, is that the Chinese 
government should encourage contracting firms to implement a differentiating pricing 
strategy. This might be accomplished by setting some contract pricing guidelines and 
redesigning the grant distribution mechanism.    
1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, China has achieved remarkable growth in its agricultural and 
rural industries by reforming its agricultural system, and has made significant progress in 
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alleviating poverty. The first step of China’s agricultural reform package was the structural 
reform of its internal agricultural economy. The household responsibility system, a family 
based production system, was fully established about twenty years ago. Many agricultural 
technological innovations and improvements have been encouraged by the government since 
then. The second step was to further engage with world markets. China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001 represented a dramatic movement toward completing its agricultural reform. In 
terms of GDP numbers, China’s progress in reducing rural poverty and improving farmer 
income is impressive.  
With most past polices gradually losing effectiveness, however, China’s agriculture is 
facing considerable challenges in terms of low agricultural prices due to large stocks of 
products, slow income growth, lack of technological advancement and increasing 
competition from foreign farm imports. Under these circumstances, millions of small-scale 
farm households in China have been unable to operate effectively, that is to respond quickly 
to changes in domestic demand and to withstand fully the pressure from increasingly 
competitive markets.  According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, there are 
about 200 million small farmers in rural areas of China. Those small households, engaged in 
mostly farming, are among the poorest in China and live in relatively poor parts of the nation. 
These poor rural areas cover most of the western and central regions. The average farm size 
in China is very small, at less than 0.7 hectares per household in 2006. Evidence from China 
suggests that, despite steady economic growth and consolidations occurring over recent 
decades, small farms still dominate in rural areas. Small farmers are usually not well 
organized, since historically, farmer-owned cooperatives and associations have not been 
developed. For most smallholders, market access has become increasingly difficult, and their 
incomes continue to lag behind the rest of the economy.  
Small rural households, characterized by their low incomes and poor productivity, 
constitute a majority of the labor force. They present a critical issue for China’s government. 
Tens of millions of small farmers are struggling to earn livelihoods and produce agricultural 
goods for developing markets. Due to their limited farm size, it is hard for them to achieve 
economies of scale. The poverty of the small farmer in China is still a growing issue, even 
though China’s progress in alleviating poverty has, indeed, been remarkable. In 2004, the 
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National Bureau of Statistics of China acknowledged that the number of rural people living 
in extreme poverty actually increased, from 28.2 million in 2002 to 29 million in 2003, 
despite rapid GDP growth during the same period. In addition, poor small farmers contribute 
to potential political instability. Finally, a labor migration trend from the rural community to 
the city has created a number of social issues, such as higher crime rates and greater 
environmental damage in urban areas. Much of this is believed to be due to the farmer 
laborers’ generally poor education.   
How can the Chinese government reconcile the limits imposed by a fragmented 
production system with the goal of improving the quality and competitiveness of agricultural 
products and increasing small-scale farmers’ incomes? One of the public strategies 
implemented by China is to encourage contract farming programs. As a result, a large 
number of agribusinesses have been created and supported by the government with the 
purpose of making agricultural production more profitable and competitive. Among different 
kinds of agribusinesses, the dominant type of institutional innovation in China is the so-
called “dragon-head-driven” agribusiness company.  Dragon-head companies are 
agribusiness firms designated by central, provincial or local governments because of their 
economic strength, operation scale, high levels of technology and good management 
practices, as well as their potential to improve local small farm incomes. The basic policy 
after the firm has been selected is to require them to agree to develop production or 
marketing systems for local farmers – systems that include market access, technology, 
technical assistance, credit and other inputs. For most of the dragon-head firms, their systems 
involve the use of contracts to collect the raw inputs from farmers. In exchange for their 
active role in rural community development, the dragon-head firms are usually able to 
receive support from all levels of government and, since 2002, financing from the 
Agricultural Development Bank of China.  In some cases the dragon-head firms that are 
engaged in contracting are also encouraged to develop “bargaining associations” for farmers, 
in an attempt to create some degree of countervailing power.        
      Direct benefits from contracting accrue to smallholders from improved access to markets, 
improved technology, better management of risk and opportunities for employment of family 
members. Indirect benefits occur from the empowerment of women and increased 
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commercial acumen on the part of smallholders. On the other hand, an agribusiness firm can 
secure the source and quality of the material needed for its production by expanding activities 
through contract farming. Contract farming has the potential to improve the welfare of 
smallholders; however it is not a sufficient condition for such improvement. Smaller farmers 
can be excluded from contracts by agribusiness firms that award contracts to larger farms. 
Smallholders can also be adversely affected by the second-round effects of contracts on 
incomes and prices, and suffer from narrowing of markets that lie outside of contracts. 
Institutional developments that might ameliorate this type of exclusion are anti-trust 
legislation, policies to directly improve the contracting environment, policies to address 
specific problems smallholders face in entering contracts, and participation by NGOs in 
contract facilitation. 
      One of the primary concerns about contract farming in China is whether it is an effective 
means to transfer technology, particularly to smallholders, and actually raise their income 
level as a consequence. Contract exclusion is not unique to China; it has been recognized in 
other developing countries. Under some circumstances, the contracting growers are degraded 
to become captive workers for extremely poor wage rates. With increasing levels of contract 
farming taking place in some developing countries, agricultural economists are concerned 
with an essential issue with regards to whether smallholders tend to be bypassed by contract 
farming (Glover and Kusterer, Key and Runsten). This concern is critical in China, because 
agriculture production in China is so fragmented, and a large proportion of farmers are small, 
with depressed farm income. Initial incentive to spread contract production is to benefit small 
growers and raise their potential to be more profitable. However, if contract terms such as 
delivery prices and investment requirements, developed by contracting firms, favor large-
scale better-off farmers, they will create such a high threshold for access to the contracts that 
small-scale farmers will eventually be forced out of contract production.   
The main goal of this paper is limited to one major theme: the extent to which and the 
reasons why small-scale poor farmers are prevented from participation in China’s rapidly 
evolving contract farming program. Within this theme are three main objectives. First, we 
discuss a number of driving factors that lead to contract exclusion in other countries. Second, 
we seek to identify a potential exclusion mechanism by the development of a conceptual 
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model, and to test whether such mechanism has taken effect in China. The last objective of 
this study is to provide evidence-based policy advice concerning the implications and 
opportunities for smallholder participation in the contract farming program in China, during a 
boom period in contract production and a restructuring of contract markets.     
We address contract exclusion both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. We 
investigate processing firms’ fundamental incentives to contract with farmers. Wealth effects, 
production efficiency, financial constraints, transaction costs and bargaining power may 
contribute jointly to a firm’s final decision to choose with what type of farmers to contract. 
We develop a principle agent model to study the potential exclusion mechanism through 
which smallholders tend to be bypassed by contractors. Several pricing strategies and their 
welfare effects are analyzed in detail in the model. In the following empirical work, two 
hypotheses derived from the model are tested by using the survey data collected in China. 
We are able to examine whether or not smallholders have been bypassed in China, and how 
contract decision and management play a role in this possible exclusion.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature with 
regard to the contract exclusion problem. Section 3 discusses a variety of pricing strategies 
that could affect contract exclusion. Section 4 develops two hypotheses and tests them using 
the survey data collected in China. Section 5 provides concluding remarks and policy 
recommendations. 
2. Literature Review 
There has been a long debate on to the impact in many developing countries of contract 
farming programs that help small-scale growers enter domestic or export markets, the 
proceeds of which contribute to rural development and poverty alleviation strategies (Glover, 
1990). The potential benefits of contract farming are being given renewed attention in the 
wake of economic reforms that have reduced public expenditures for such items as credit 
programs, stable crop price supports, input subsidies, and government research and extension 
programs. While contract farming promises significant benefits for growers in many cases, 
recent studies have highlighted circumstances in which members of the rural population have 
realized only limited gains, or have been directly or indirectly harmed by contract farming 
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programs. In some cases, contract farming has been criticized as being a tool for agribusiness 
firms to exploit an unequal power relationship with growers.  
      However, less attention has been given to whether contract farming will even reach small 
farmers who are the direct targets of poverty reduction programs. This should be a higher 
priority issue, because smallholders cannot receive the potential benefits if they are excluded 
from participating in the contract farming system. As a result of exclusion due to size, 
contract farming benefits may primarily go to relatively few large-scale growers instead of a 
huge number of smallholders. For example, Singh (2000) argues that the evidence suggests 
the vast majority of contract farming schemes exclude small farmers.  
One of the earliest studies to identify the exclusion of smallholders from the contract 
farming program come from Glover and Kusterer (1990). Their work demonstrate that 
agribusiness firms do seem to prefer large farmers, due to their obvious lower transaction 
costs, although in some cases, the contracting firms seek out small farmers. The main reason 
for their frequent exclusion seems to be the inconvenience of finding many small farmers, 
and then furnishing them with contracts, inputs, and technical assistance. This is an obvious 
disadvantage from the perspective of transaction costs.  
      Key and Runsten (1999) demonstrate how market conditions are likely to be associated 
with particular grower characteristics under contract farming. They find that recent 
experiences in Latin America have been mixed regarding the extent to which agro-industrial 
firms have incorporated smallholders into the production process. Despite the highly labor-
intensive nature of most processed crops, many firms shun smallholders, preferring to 
contract with larger capitalized growers (Runsten and Key, 1996). Often, these large-scale 
contract farmers hire-in seasonal laborers, who are themselves smallholders. Although most 
firms appear to favor contracting with larger growers, there have been several examples of 
agro-industrial firms contracting simultaneously with both large and small landholders. 
Bivings and Runsten (1992) suggest that governments could reinforce the labor cost 
advantages of small family farms by enforcing labor laws, the minimum wage, and 
workplace health standards on large farms. The diseconomies of scale suffered by small 
growers can be reduced by eliminating policy distortions and institutional biases that work 
against smallholders, and by promoting research into cropping technologies that reflect the 
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relative prices of labor, capital and land faced by smallholders. The principal agent model 
proposed by Key and Runstern includes participation and enforcement constraints. However, 
there is no specified model analysis that could address exclusion problem. This paper does 
provide us a number of insights and sound arguments with respect to which type of grower 
should be selected in a specific market situation.  
Warning, Key and Hoo (2002) explore the reasons behind the general exclusion of small 
farmers from contract farming, and examine several cases in which small farmers have 
participated – successfully or unsuccessfully - in contract farming schemes. They try to 
identify the features of the successful schemes that led to positive social performance, with 
an eye toward informing policy development. Transaction cost is still the most significant 
factor considered in the interpretation for exclusion. Contracting firms face a variety of fixed, 
per-grower transactions costs, including screening applicants, negotiating the contracts, 
providing information on required production methods and standards, delivering inputs, 
monitoring grower behavior, and enforcing contract terms. A firm, thus, tries to minimize 
these fixed transaction costs in the production of a given quantity of product by choosing 
fewer growers, each with greater production. Warning, Key and Hoo consider only 
transaction cost: choosing the large grower seems to be a natural consequence under this 
argument.  
      Sartorius (2002) explores ways that small farmers can be cost effectively incorporated in 
modern agricultural supply chains. The results demonstrate that small-scale farmers can 
successfully compete with larger growers with respect to production and cost efficiency. The 
results also illustrate that small-scale farmers generate higher transaction costs than medium 
and large-scale farmers. A series of proposals are then developed to reduce the transaction 
costs of small farm contracts. Sartorius concludes that small-scale farmers can be 
successfully incorporated in agribusiness supply chains, but only if special measures are 
taken to reduce differential transaction costs. It is suggested that agribusiness should install 
sophisticated costing systems, encourage the formation of farmer associations and ensure that 
the raw commodity characteristics are suited to smallholder production systems. These 
results provide many useful policy implications for making contract farming programs reach 
smallholders by trying to develop an applicable strategy.    
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Throughout these discussions, we find that most of the previous research tries to provide 
a reasonable explanation of why contract exclusion occurs by studying some specific cases. 
The vast majority of studies rely on simple descriptive analysis rather than identifying and 
developing a specific exclusion mechanism through which smallholders are actually 
bypassed. Our emphasis is on developing an exclusion mechanism by incorporating hidden 
information into a contract model. Since the contracting firms have significant power, in 
many cases, to set the contract terms and other access conditions, if they strongly prefer to 
select large-scale farmers, they can develop a pricing term or a minimum transaction volume 
term that is acceptable only to large farmers. More specifically, we attempt to investigate 
pricing mechanisms that can easily be implemented in the contract by the contracting firms. 
This pricing strategy could play an important role in excluding small farmers from the 
contract farming program in real practice.  
Several incentives explain why we want to focus on the pricing strategy in the 
development of the mechanism. First of all, the pricing provision in the agricultural contract 
has been identified as one of the most important factors that determine both parties’ 
willingness to sign contracts in China. Guo, Jolly and Zhu (2007) have shown that the pricing 
provision in the contract plays a critical role in the implementation of contracts in rural China. 
As we know, price significantly influences how much benefit the farmer can receive from 
participating in the contract. Second, the pricing term can easily be used as an alternative tool 
for excluding small farmers, when quantity screening or other instruments are prohibited by 
contract law. In most market-oriented economies, the price provision in the contract is free to 
be set by one of the contracting parties. Finally, from the policy implication perspective, it is 
possible for the government to improve the performance of the contract farming program by 
monitoring the pricing article in each contract. The government could distribute more tax and 
financial credits to those contracting firms with pricing strategies more accessible to the 
small-scale farmer. The contract model with hidden information would be very useful and 
powerful in replicating the real situation faced by farmers throughout the contracting decision 
process. The empirical field data collected in China can eventually be used to test whether 
the pricing design has a significant impact on the occurrences of exclusion.  
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3. Contract Exclusion Conceptual Model 
In this section, we develop an applied contract model with hidden information in order to 
analyze different pricing strategies that are likely to be carried out by contracting firms to 
exclude small farmers. Several key factors that could affect contract exclusion, such as 
transaction costs and production efficiency, are incorporated into the conceptual model to 
produce a realistic situation. A number of simple results with some assumed parameter 
values are examined to illustrate the results when a closed solution for the model does not 
exist.  
3.1 Basic contract model 
      In this model, we only consider the transaction between an agro-processing business and 
a pool of farmers who decide whether to accept a contract. The agri-business firm is a 
principal, and he sets the terms of contracts. There are two dominant types of contract, in 
general: the production contract and the marketing contract. In a production contract, most of 
inputs, services and technology are provided and managed by the contracting firm. The 
farmer just supplies of the land and labor. The relevance and importance of each type of 
contract varies from product to product and over time, and the two types are not mutually 
exclusive. In our model, we assume that it is a type of production contract, and the 
production cost is ultimately provided by the business firm, qcC ⋅=1 , in which the lower 
case c  is the unit production cost associated with the output level. The farm population 
consists of two types of contracting farmers: large-scale farmers with proportion β  and 
small-scale farmers with proportion ( )β−1 . Proportion β  is the given exogenous variable. 
Furthermore, the farmer receives the transfer ( )qw  from the firm by providing output level q .  
      Contract production requires a certain initial investment to build the facility and purchase 
equipment. This fixed capital cost is typically incurred by the contracted farmer. Assume that 
large farmers are more likely to adopt the new technology in order to achieve production 
efficiency, based on the fact that large, better-off farms have more free capital to invest. In 
addition, assuming that the production function takes the traditional Cobb-Douglas function 
form ii Akq
α= and sli ,= , representing two different technologies for large-scale and small-
scale farmers, we have 1<< ls αα .  
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      The transaction cost incurred in the process of contract production is proportional to the 
output level for both types of farmers. The firms will pay for this cost, qtC i=2  and sli ,= . 
Assume sl tt <  to be consistent with the well-accepted fact that larger farmers tend to incur a 
lower unit transaction cost. As a result, the overall margin for the contracting firm 
is ( )ii tPP −=~ , and P  is the prevailing output price on the market. Therefore, we 
have sl PP
~~ > . In addition, we assume that the farmer, depending on the type, has the initial 
wealth ia , and sl aa > , since the large farmer is wealthier. Finally, the reservation utility is 
assumed as iu , for large-scale and small-scale of farms. Since a large farm’s initial wealth is 
greater than a small farm’s, we must have sl uu > .    
3.2 Common pricing strategy—contract exclusion 
Suppose that farm type is directly observed by the contracting firm. This assumption was 
true in China before the contract farming program was in force, when the size of the farm had 
been assigned by the local village authority and renting land was prohibited. In this case, the 
contracting firm would determine a set of ( ){ }ii qwq ,  to solve its maximization problem  
iii
iwiq
wqP −~max
,
 
 ( ) iiii uAqwau i ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+ α1/ .                                              (1) 
      The minus term in the above condition is the required capital input as the inverse form of 
the production function. The Lagrange equation takes the form  
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++−= iiiiiii uAqwauwqP iαλξ
1
/~ ,                              (2) 
The first order condition gives us the following results  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 0~ /11/1 =⋅′−=∂∂ −−− iiiiiii qAuPq ααα αλξ  
( ) 01 =⋅′+−=∂∂ uwi λξ                                                      (3) 
 84 
 
 
      We are able to solve the above equations and obtain the solution as ( ) i iiiii APq αααα −= 1/1~ .  
The optimal output level for each type of farmer relies largely on its own characteristics, such 
as the production efficiency and transaction cost level. Under this pricing strategy, we will 
achieve the first best welfare outcome and no contract exclusion will occur, since all farms 
have been selected by the firm.  
Suppose the information to clearly identify the type of farm is not available to the 
contracting firm, or it requires additional efforts that are associated with high additional costs 
in most cases. In current practice in China after several agricultural reforms, the farmer can 
freely rent farm land from another farmer without any local government permission, even 
though the local government still owns the property rights to the land. In this case, it would 
be very difficult to tell which farm is large and which is small. In addition, there is no third-
party, like the independent agent or government agent in China, who was able to provide 
farm size information. Put another way, the procuring or monitoring cost is very high in 
order to obtain farm size information. In the following model, hidden information is assumed, 
and assumed to be prevailing in the following mechanism designs.    
      If the firm can no longer observe the type of farmer, it has to offer the same contract to 
everyone. The simple case is the common pricing strategy, also called the linear pricing 
strategy. In this case, the firm’s contract specifies a common price w  for each unit of 
output iq . Given this contract, the farmer chooses iq  to maximize 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ i
i A
qwqau iiiq
α
1
max  where sli ,=  
FOC:                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 0/11/1 =−⋅′ −−− iiiii qAwu ααα α                                      (4) 
As a result, the output solution takes the form ( ) ( )wDAwq iiiiii == −αααα 1/1 , and sli ,= .  
We know that
i
i
α
α
−1 , ( ) i
i
i α
αα −1  and iA α−1
1
 are increasing functions of the production 
coefficient iα . So the optimal production output for the large-scale farmer will be typically 
greater than that of the small-scale farmer when the linear price w  is greater than 1.  
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      To obtain the optimal maximum utility, we plug the solution back into the contracting 
farmer’s objective function:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+ −−− iiiiii AAwAwwau iii αααα
αα αα /11 1/11/1  
                                 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= − 111 1
i
ii iwAau αα α                                                          (5) 
      For example, when 8.0=A ,
2
1=lα  and 3
1=sα , we will have ( )216.0 wauu ll +=  
and ( )5.1275.0 wauu ss += . So which type of utility is greater would depend on the relative 
value between the output price w  and production coefficient A , and the difference between 
initial wealth. For instance, the former will be greater than the latter 
if 5.12 275.016.0 wawa sl +>+ . In the meantime, if we perform a sensitivity analysis, we will 
have the following result: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1
1
12
1/1 >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=∂
∂ − −− i
i
i
ii
i
i
i
i wAw
wD α
α
α
αα
α
αα                               (6) 
      Basically, this says that each type of farmer is willing to produce more output if offered a 
higher linear price. That is common sense. Finally, with a common price contract, the firm’s 
problem is to maximize 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )wDwPwDwP ssllw −−+− ~1~max ββ  
FOC: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0~11~ =′−−+−−′−+− wDwPwDwDwPwD ssslll ββββ  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )wDwD
wDwDwDPwDPw
sl
slssll
′−+′
−−−′−+′= ββ
ββββ
1
1~1~
                  (7) 
      We are able to derive simple case results with the above parameter values, and further 
assuming 2.0=β . As a result, the output will be priced in a highly dimensional 
function ls PwPww
~64.0~208.0624.028.1 2/12/1 =−+ − . If we know the market price, the output 
unit price will be solved.  
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Ignoring the transaction cost difference for a simple illustration, we will have the same 
margins for both types of farmers such that PPP sl
~~~ == . In addition, if we 
define ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )wDwDwD sl ββ −+= 1 , the firm’s objective function will be reduced as 
( ) ( )wDwP
w
−~max   .                                                   (8) 
      In this case, the contracting firm is performing like a monopoly in the market and the 
monopoly price is given by ( )( )wD
wDPwm ′−=
~ .  
      In this solution, we have Pwm
~< ; that is, ( ) 0>′ wD , since the monopoly firm can make a 
profit only by setting a price short of marginal price and ( ) 0>⋅′D . This is true by taking 
derivatives with respect to the common price  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 >′−+′=′ wDwDwD sl ββ                                         (9) 
      We should be aware that, depending on the values of ( )slsl APP ααβ ,,,~,~, , it may be 
optimal for the contracting firm to set the common price so low that only the large-scale 
farmers would decide to accept the contract. On this circumstance, the small-scale farmer 
would reject the offer and be excluded from the contract program. If we go back to look at 
the reservation utility, it is easy to see the situation under which the exclusion occurs 
( ) ( )( ) iiii uAwDwwDau i ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+ α1/  
( ) ( )( ) iiii uAwDwwDa i ~/ 1 ≥−+ α  
( ) ( )i
i
iii Aauw
i αα
α α
/
1
~ 1
1
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−≥   .                                        (10) 
      Since the utility function is a monotonic increasing function, its inverse function can be 
formed to calibrate iu~ . Therefore, the common price must be no less than a certain level 
specified in the above formula. Please note that this lower band expression is not a 
monotonic function of technical coefficient variable iα . In our numerical example, if 2
1=lα  
and
3
1=sα , we are able to obtain ( ) 2~2 −−≥ lll auAw  and ( ) 2
3~485.8 −−≥ sss auAw . We find the 
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inequality condition that ( ) ( ) 22/3 ~2~49.8 −− −≥− llss auAauA  if ( ) ( ) 2/32 ~~25.4 ssll auau −≥− .  
This indicates that the unit price minimum requirement, threshold to enter the contract, for a 
small-scale farmer is likely to be higher than that for large-scale farmer. In other words, the 
small-scale farmer is more likely to be screened by the contracting firm when l sw w w≤ ≤ is 
satisfied. It should be noted, however, that neither type of farmer will accept the contract if 
the offered unit price is too low to reach the reservation utility for either type. In other words, 
no optimal solution will exist for unit price w .  
      If we continue to solve for the common price, we are able to further obtain 
( ) ( ) s
s
ss
sl
l
ll
l
AwAwwD sl
α
α
αα
αα
α
αα
α
αβαβ
−
−
−
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
11
1
11
1 1  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ssssslllll wAwAwD
s
s
s
l
l
l α
α
α
ααα
α
α
αα
α
ααβα
ααβ − −−− −− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=′ 1
12
1/11
12
1/1
1
1
1
     (11) 
      In our numerical example, the above results are ( ) ( ) 2
1
32
3
11
2
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= wAwAwD ββ  
and ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=′ −2
1
2
1
32
2
1
3
11
2
1 wAAwD ββ , so the ultimate common price becomes 
( )
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=
−
2
1
2
1
32
2
1
32
2
1
3
11
2
1
3
11
2
1
~
wAA
wAwA
Pw
ββ
ββ
                              (12) 
      Defining ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 2
2
1 Am β  and ( ) 2
1
3
3
11 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= An β , the above function will take the reduced 
form 
0~
2
1~
2
32 2
12
2
13
2
1
=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
nPwmPwnwm                            (13) 
      The optimal linear price is a cubic function with respect to 2
1−
w , and it is difficult to 
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obtain the closed solution for it due to the complexity. The general solution takes the 
functional form ( ), , , ,l sw h P Aβ α α= % . The small-scale farmer would typically not be selected 
by the agribusiness firm when l sw w w≤ ≤ .  
3.3 Differentiating pricing strategy—second best outcome 
Under a differentiating pricing strategy, the firm will offer two types of take-it-or-leave-it 
offers designed with incentives to stimulate the small-scale and large-scale farmer to accept 
its respective offer. So the contracting firm basically provides two sets of offers with 
different output levels, and total revenue ( ) ( ){ })(,,)(, llss qwqqwq . Subject to the participation 
and incentive conditions, the farmer would only be able to accept the offer that is consistent 
with his type. Patrick and Dewatripont (2005) have shown that social welfare generally 
would be improved under this pricing strategy when compared to the linear pricing strategy, 
the so-called second best outcome. Due to the complexity of the second best outcome, we are 
not trying to develop a full derivation of the ultimate solution, but to implement the method 
proposed by Patrick and Dewatripont (2005) and derive a general result that helps us 
understand the potential benefit the small farmer could obtain from this pricing strategy. In 
this case we find that this pricing strategy typically results in more participation of small-
scale farmers, in the sense that small farmers can always accept the offer that better fits their 
interests. In this case, the objective function for the firm becomes 
Max  ( ) ( ) ( )1l l l s s sp q w q p q w qβ β⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦% %  
              ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+= iA
qqwauq iiiii
α
1
maxarg  
i
i
iii uA
qqwau i ≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ α
1
  .                                        (14) 
      The indicator i represents the type of farmer, large or small. We find that there are four 
total restriction conditions in the above optimization problem. We know there are several 
approaches to solving this problem, but we use only the simple discrete-step method to 
demonstrate that the result is what we need. In the first step, the revelation principle will be 
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applied to the above problem. Let ( )i iw q w= , for ,i l s= , then the problem can be fully 
rewritten as 
,
max
w qi i
  [ ] ( )[ ]1l l l s s sp q w p q wβ β− + − −% %  
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ ll A
qwauA
qwau ssllll
αα
11
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ ssl A
qwauA
qwau llssss
αα
11
 
l
l
lll uA
qqwau l ≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ α
1
 
s
s
sss uA
qqwau s ≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ α
1
.                                              (15) 
The first two restriction conditions indicate that the large-scale farmer would be better off 
to choose the large-scale type of offer; likewise, the small farmer would choose the small-
scale type of offer.  In the second step, since the utility function ( )⋅u  is a monotonic 
increasing function, we are able to remove the utility function and obtain the following 
inequalities: 
1 1
l ll s
l s
q qw wA A
α α⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠   and 
1 1
s ss l
s l
q qw wA A
α α⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
1
ll
l l l l
qa w q uA
α⎛ ⎞+ − ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ %   and 
1
ss
s s s s
qa w q uA
α⎛ ⎞+ − ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ % .                        (16) 
      We know from the empirical experience that the first and the last constraints usually bind. 
Then we can reduce our restrictions from four to two conditions, where only the second and 
third constraints are in effect:  
,
max
w qi i
  [ ] ( )[ ]1l l l s s sp q w p q wβ β− + − −% %  
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1 1
l ll s
l s
q qw wA A
α α⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ≥ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
s
s
sss uA
qqwa s ~
1
≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+ α .                                                    (17) 
We are only interested in the non-corner solution, so the above two constraints would 
bind, as well. We substitute the output variables ( )ls qq ,  for the revenue variables ( )ls ww ,  to 
leave only two variables available in the above maximization equation system, and we have 
the following reduced objective function: 
,
max
q ql s
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1
s ss s
s s s s
l ll s
l l s s
s s
q qu a u aA Aq qp q p qA A q q
α α
α αβ β
− + − +
− + − + − −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
% %
% %      (18) 
      The ultimate solution for variables ( )ls qq ,  can be derived directly from the first order 
condition applied to the above objective function: 
               ( )
1
11 1 0
ll
ll l
l l
p q
q A
αα
αξ α
−⎛ ⎞∂ ⎛ ⎞= − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
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1 1
1
1
1
2
1 1
1 1
ss ssss s s
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q A q
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%
 
    ( )
( )
1 1
1
2
1 1
1 0
ss ssss s s
s
s
s
qq u a AA
p
q
αα ααα
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−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− − + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥+ − − =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
%
%            (19) 
      Basically, we are able to solve two unknown variables from the above two equations. 
Due to the complexity of this highly dimensional function, it is difficult to obtain a solution 
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with closed forms for variables ( )ls qq , . After output levels ( )ls qq ,  are solved, we can 
substitute them back to get the solution for pricing variables ( )ls ww , .  
So far, we have developed the differentiating pricing strategy through the above several 
discrete solving steps.  The optimal solution for the output level and its associated revenue 
( )ii wq ,  in terms of the type of farmer has been derived even though the closed form of 
solution cannot be obtained. Given the offer, in accordance with this strategy, the small 
farmer would like to take his best offer and sign the contract with the contracting firm. So, 
ideally, the whole proportion of small farmers, specified as β , should be involved in the 
contract farming program. As a result, social welfare would be considerably improved when 
compared to that of the common pricing strategy, largely due to the higher involvement rate 
of the small farmers.  
      In this section, we have identified a potential mechanism that could cause the exclusion 
of small-scale farmers from the contract farming program. Pricing strategy turns out to be an 
effective tool that the contracting firm can utilize to limit contracts to large-scale farmers. 
Due to their technical efficiency and lower transaction costs, large-scale farmers are more 
likely to accept a contract price that is found unprofitable for small farmers.  As a result, in 
the common pricing strategy, small farmers are more likely to be excluded from contract 
farming.  Within the model, a series of factors, such as production efficiency and transaction 
cost, are taken into account at the same time. 
      Our finding indicates that differentiating pricing can potentially be developed as an 
effective tool to achieve the second best outcome and, thereby, make contracts more 
accessible to small farmers. According to this mechanism, the government should redesign 
its current policy and distribute tax credits and financial supports to contracting firms based 
on the pricing terms underwritten in the contracts. The itemized pricing terms, with one type 
of benefit offer and transaction quantity for the large-scale farmer and the other for the small-
scale farmer should be the standard sample for contracting firms to follow. Depending on 
their different types of products, those awarded offers should vary from one industry to the 
other, and there is no one rule of thumb for all contracting products. However, differentiating 
pricing should be established to determine the offers. If the contracting firm adopts a 
differentiating pricing contract, it should be eligible to receive financial support and tax 
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credits from the government. In the contract farming program in China, the government has 
historically allocated supporting grant based on simple participation proportion statistics, a 
ratio between small contracted farmers and total contracted farmers. Since this ratio has been 
provided directly from the contracting firm, it has been very difficult for the government to 
determine whether or not the contracting firm has honestly reported the participation rate of 
small farmers. This criterion may not be effective in most cases, since the contracting firm 
has a strong incentive to split its large-scale farm partners into small pieces by obtaining 
contract signatures from the large partners’ relatives. Due to the high density population in 
the rural area of China and to loose legal restrictions, it is very easy for large farms to obtain 
agreements to sign contracts from their nearby relatives. Some government officials, 
interviewed through the survey conducted by Guo, Jolly and Zhu (2007), have confirmed the 
prevalence of such trickery played by large farms. However, the contract, containing the 
transaction price is in a standard legal format and can easily be inspected by a third party and 
the government. Therefore, the findings from the differentiating price strategy would be very 
helpful in composing a sample contract that would improve the benefits received by the small 
farmer. 
      In the next section, two hypotheses are derived from this contract model, and we 
empirically test these hypotheses by using survey data from rural China. 
4. Hypothesis Testing 
Contract farming offers an effective means to increase farm income and promote rural 
economic development. On the other hand, if smallholders are excluded from contracts, 
contract farming will serve worsen income distribution and lead to asset inequalities. The 
paper outlines a number of disadvantages associated with a variety of market imperfections 
when agro-industrial firms write contracts with smallholders. Small holders can be excluded 
from contracts due to selection bias. As a result, contracting firms can exclusively award 
contracts to large farmers. 
      In this section, we empirically investigate whether or not an exclusion mechanism, driven 
by the pricing strategy presented in the previous section, exists. We use rural survey data 
collected in China. In order to achieve this goal, two sets of hypotheses have been established 
and tested. The first hypothesis is whether or not small farmers tend to be bypassed by the 
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contract farming program in China. A positive test result would direct us to investigate the 
second hypothesis of whether or not the pricing strategy has played a significant role in 
facilitating such exclusion. The fundamental goal is to test the second hypothesis, but it 
largely relies on the preliminary test result from the first hypothesis. If there were no 
evidence supporting the exclusion of small farmers in China’s contract farming program, we 
would not see a need to investigate any driving mechanisms that could lead to exclusion.  
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Are small farmers excluded from China’s contract farming 
program? 
4.1.1 Data source        
In order to explore the potential exclusion mechanism, we first must hypothesize that 
exclusion does exist in China’s contract farming program. This hypothesis can be tested by 
applying a regression model to rural farm level data collected in China. 
Farm level data were collected through a survey conducted by more than 60 
undergraduate students from Zhejiang University in China when they returned to their home 
villages during winter break in February 2004. In total, farmers from 13 provinces and 47 
counties were included in the survey. The survey included questions about the farm 
household characteristics, farm production status and the household’s involvement with the 
contract farming program. Survey interviewers were well-trained before they returned home. 
Students returned 1820 surveys, of which 1035 were complete and usable.  
Farmers involved in the survey can be classified into three groups: farmers who have 
contracts, farmers who decided not to contract and farmers who were not offered a contract. 
Basically, the latter two groups of farmers are excluded from contract farming. The three 
groups are tagged “Offered/Accepted,” “Offered/Rejected” and “Not Offered,” respectively. 
In addition, contracts studied in the survey cover a wide range of industries, such as 
vegetable farming, fisheries and hog production. Thus farmers are expected to be 
heterogeneous in terms of production characteristics and farm income. To test the first 
hypothesis, we include the entire 1035 observations in the sample.  
4.1.2 Specification of the estimation equation 
A Multinomial Logit model (MNL) can help us determine how individual characteristics 
affect their likelihood of being in certain categories of a dependent variable. In the 
 94 
 
 
multinomial logit model, the independent variables contain characteristics of individuals, 
whereas they are the attributes of the choices in the conditional logit model. If instead, we are 
interested in how the characteristics of the categories affect an individual’s likelihood of 
falling within them, the conditional logit model should be chosen. In the conditional logit 
approach, each individual is given a value for each of the different potential options available 
to him/her. However, in our sample we have no such choice characteristic variables available. 
For example, we don’t know how much more land a farmer who rejected the contract would 
pursue if he accepted the contract. Only one state outcome has been observed for each 
individual in the sample. 
A multinomial logit regression model (Greene, 1993) has the following form: 
∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ′
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where ijp  is the likelihood of the contract participation choice,  is the ith individual and 
j ( j =1, 2 or 3) is the jth  category of the dependent variable. We have three contracting 
choices for each individual: 1 stands for “Not Offered,” 2 for “Offered/Rejected” and 3 for 
“Offered/Accepted.” 
      We are fitting the log-odds of membership in each category of the dependent variable 
versus some baseline category as a linear function of covariates ( )pjxij ,..2,1= :  
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log .                            (21) 
The first category ( 1=j , “Not Offered”) is treated as the baseline category in our 
estimations. 
Studies from Lajili et al. (1997), Sartwelle et al. (2000) and Key (2003) find that a 
farmer’s choice to enter into contract farming could be affected by farm characteristics, 
operation features and market attributes. Six independent variables have been included in the 
regression model: (1 and 2) In the farmer attribute category we use the age and education 
level of the head of a household as explanatory variables, since the participation decision is 
mainly determined by household head. We expect that both younger farmers and lower-
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education farmers are more likely to accept contracts, because they want to rely more on the 
contract farming program to market their products. (3 and 4) The farm size and farm income 
of each household are collected, as they play a positive role in accepting contracts. (5 and 6) 
Market characteristic variables, the distance from the household to the target market as well 
as the government support dummy, have been included. The longer the distance to the target 
market, the more likely farmers will sign contracts to market their products. The existence of 
the government support policy provided to the contract farming program should positively 
affect the contract decision.  
As a result, the above estimation equation can be written in a more general form: 
fY = (Age, Education, Size,Income,Distance,Support),                       (22) 
where Y is the log-odds ratio and six variables are used to explain the contract choice 
decision.  
Table 1 reports descriptive characteristics of the sample, categorized into three groups 
that are based on the farm’s type. The notes below the table describe how each variable was 
estimated in the sample. The table highlights some differences among the three types of 
farmers. Contracting growers are slightly younger and more educated than the independent 
growers who either rejected the offer or were not offered contracts, but the disparities are not 
significant in the sample. The average farm size of contract farmers is almost twice than that 
of the other two independent farmers. Farmers with contracts have an income on average, 
2,000 Chinese Yuan (1$us is approximately 7.5 Yuan) higher than those farmers who have 
been excluded from contract production.  
4.1.3 Results 
We report the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values with respect to the base 
outcome (“Not Offered”) in Table 2. Thus, we have two groups of estimates: 
“Offered/Rejected” farmers versus “Not Offered” farmers, and “Offered/Accepted” farmers 
versus “Not Offered” farmers. Tests are also conducted to determine whether the assumption 
underlying the multinomial logit specification is appropriate.  
Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained, and the baseline category is the “Not 
Offered” category of farmers. The result indicates that production size is a positive and 
significant factor in affecting a farmer’s contract decision. The coefficient estimate tells us 
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how the log-odds of falling into the category as of farmers who accepted contracts and 
farmers who rejected contracts, versus farmers who were not offered contracts, changes with 
every change of the explanatory variables. Values above zero indicate that higher values of 
the explanatory variable increase the predicted probability for a given group, compared to the 
“Not Offered” outcome. Coefficients less than zero indicate the opposite. We can see that in 
the  “Offered/Accepted” versus the “Not Offered” group, large-scale farmers are more likely 
to join in contract production than relatively small farmers. In other words, small farmers 
tend to be excluded from the contract farming, probably due to contracting firms’ selection 
bias. The exclusion can be driven either by the variety of factors like those discussed in the 
first part of the paper or by the pricing mechanism demonstrated in the contract model 
section. The same result is found for “Offered/Rejected” versus “Not Offered,” in which the 
coefficient estimate for the amount of land is 0.014, with a p value less than 0.05.  As a result, 
we find evidence that small farmers are more likely to be excluded from China’s contract 
farming program. The hypothesis testing indicates a positive result. Therefore, it is natural to 
test the second hypothesis on the role that pricing strategy plays in driving the exclusion.  We 
want to identify whether the pricing strategy demonstrated in the previous section, has been 
utilized as an effective exclusionary tool.    
In addition, well-educated independent farmers take advantage of their own production 
resources and local markets to sell their products, based on results from both comparison 
groups although the effect is not significant. We expected farmers facing a greater distance to 
target markets to be more likely to exercise contracts in order to reduce their pricing and 
marketing risks. However, both comparison groups present estimates, other things being 
equal, of the inverse effects of these two market characteristics, and at a significantly 
statistical level. A higher education level and the availability of government support seem to 
have an inconclusive impact on the likelihood of contract acceptance.  
      The most serious assumption within the multinomial logit framework is the assumption 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Greene, 1993). This assumption is that the 
relative odds between any two outcomes are independent of the number and nature of other 
outcomes being simultaneously considered. The clearest case of a violation of this property is 
when certain outcomes serve as substitutes for others. Specifically, we have conducted a 
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Hausman test of the maintained assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
If two alternatives are more similar to one another than to the third alternative, as might be 
supposed if individuals first are chosen to be offered contracts and then decide whether to 
accept or reject the contract, we would expect the IIA test to reveal such similarities. The fact 
that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the MNL model is appropriate for our 
data lends further credibility to the use of this specification. The test result is reported in 
Table 3.  
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Has the linear pricing strategy led to contract exclusion? 
4.2.1 Data source 
The firm level data were gathered by mail in rural China in 2004(Guo, Jolly and Zhu). 
The survey was mailed to 111 agribusiness dragon-head firms in Zhejiang province under the 
name “Contract Farming Project”. A total of 80 usable copies of the survey were returned. 
During the same period, between July and August 2004, we interviewed an additional 36 
firms. So there is firm-level survey data from 116 total firms.  
      Out of 116 dragon-head firms included in the survey, 100 were involved in contract 
farming. The contracting experience varies across firms.  Out of the total, 65 firms have 
engaged in contracting for more than three years, 31 firms are between one and three years 
and only four firms have less than one year of experience. In addition, these 100 agribusiness 
firms operate in a variety of marketing and production industries. This may reduce the 
quality of survey data, because different production requirements and characteristics appear 
across industries. We are not able to focus on a specific industry, due to the lack of enough 
observations. Among the 100 agribusiness firms included in the survey, 63 firms signed 
production contracts with farms. The type of contract largely depends on the categories of 
delivered goods. Our data suggest that a marketing contract is commonly used in the fruit, 
vegetable and tea processing industries, whereas production contracts are more common in 
meat and dairy processing industries.  
4.2.2 Model and selected variables 
      The test of the first hypothesis suggests that large-scale farmers are more likely to be 
targeted by contracting firms than small-scale farmers. This finding motivates us to take a 
step further and examine the influence of the pricing mechanism on contract exclusion. 
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Based on the mechanism design studies in the contract model, we hypothesize that common 
pricing strategy should be more likely to result in exclusion. The second hypothesis tests 
whether or not the linear pricing strategy has been employed by contracting firms to 
implement the exclusion of small farmers, conditional on the fact that such exclusion did 
occur in rural China.  
A Logistic regression model has been applied to the sample, with exclusion type of the 
contracting firm as the dummy dependent variable and a series of independent variables 
discussed below. The general model takes the form  
( ) iii XFY εβ += ;             and        0=iY  ,1                                  (23) 
where iY  is binary choice in which 1 stands for the firm that excludes small farmers and 0 for 
the firm that doesn’t. We use iX  to represent all of the explanatory variables.  
      These firm-level dependent and independent variables are illustrated in Table 4. 
Contracting firms have been grouped into two classes: the exclusion type that mainly 
conducts its contracting business with large farmers and the non-exclusion type that exercises 
contracts with small farmers. Large-scale farmers are those farmers who have 20 hectares of 
land or total investment assets of more than 100,000 Chinese Yuan. We have clearly 
specified this qualification in the survey, so each contracting firm can calculate its proportion 
of small farmers to its total targeted farmers. In the survey, we ask each contracting firm 
“what is your current proportion of small contractees to the total contractees.” Three choices 
are provided: A is 0 to 25%, B is 25% to 50%, and C is over 50%.  Contracting firms who 
answered “A” or “B” are identified as exclusionary type contracting firms, and all other firms 
are non-exclusionary type contracting firms. The dummy value 0 represents the non-
exclusionary type of contracting firm and 1, exclusionary type.  
Three types of variables are expected to influence a firm’s decision about whether or not 
to exclude small farmers: (1) contracting environment, including tax load and support policy 
(Key and Runsten, 1999); (2) contracting experience, represented by years of contracting 
service (Glover and Kusterer, 1990); (3) market characteristics (Singh, 2002). Moreover, 
based on results from the contract model section, we hypothesize that different pricing 
mechanisms should influence a firm’s exclusion type. We have summarized independent 
variables in Table 4. The simple firm-level tax load variable is calculated by dividing the 
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total tax paid by the total profit for each firm. We expect this variable to positively affect the 
firm’s exclusion type. The second variable is the duration of contracting experience, 
determined by the number of contracting years. The longer the firm has been contracting 
with farmers, the higher the likelihood the firm will contract with small farmers, because of 
more chances to receive government supporting grant. The average duration of contracting 
experience is slightly less than 3 years. As a market variable, the absolute price fluctuation 
percentage degree has been collected. It is expected to negatively affect the contracting firm 
being an exclusionary type. The government support dummy variable, which is 1 for 
receiving government support and 0 for receiving no support, is one of the independent 
variables because it can affect the firm’s contracting decision. Receiving government support 
could make contracting firms more likely to be the non-exclusionary type.  
The key variable investigated here is the pricing variable that is used by contracting firms. 
This is a dummy variable, where value 0 means that linear pricing is being used by the firm, 
and 1 means that differentiating pricing is being used. In the survey we ask the question, 
“Which type of pricing term is being used in your firm?” Two choices are provided: A. One 
uniform price for all farmers; B. Differentiated prices based on the amount of collected goods. 
Choice A corresponds to linear pricing and choice B to differentiating pricing. Therefore, the 
pricing dummy is 1 if B is chosen by a contracting firm and 0 otherwise. Each firm is 
required to report its pricing structure. Since, discussed in the contract model section, 
differentiating pricing tends to reduce exclusion, the expected sign of this pricing dummy 
variable is negative.  
4.2.3 Results 
      As illustrated in the model section, linear pricing can be used as an instrument to exclude 
small-scale farmers, but differentiating pricing can reduce the exclusion, involving more 
small-scale farmers in contract farming. This hypothesis is tested by using a discrete choice 
model, and the results are reported in Table 5. Maximum likelihood estimates have been 
obtained, and the overall fitting of the logistic regression is good, because most of coefficient 
estimates are strongly significant, with p-values less than 0.05.  
      First of all, the firm-level income tax rate significantly increases the probability of being 
an exclusionary type of contracting firm. This result is consistent with our initial expectation, 
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because contracting firms can receive tax credits from the government by raising the 
participation percentage of small farmers. The government tax reduction policy, with the 
purpose of supporting the dragon-head firms, was initially based on the participation rate of 
small farmers. These participation ratio statistics were provided by contracting firms and 
were very likely to be overstated in order to receive tax credits. This finding provides 
evidence that the tax credit policy plays a significant role in influencing a firm’s contracting 
decision. To be qualified for tax credits, contracting firms have to meet requirements 
established by their local government. In most rural areas, the minimum requirement is about 
a 70 percent participation rate of small farmers. The tax credit is in a range from 4 percent to 
8 percent in most provinces, depending on the type of dragon-head firm and the availability 
of government grant. Local government has the authority to establish such tax credits.  
      Second, the result suggests that longer contracting experience, represented by the 
duration of contracts, should make contracting firms more likely to contract with small-scale 
farmers. Consistent with expectation, the coefficient estimator for this covariate is -1.17, with 
p value less than 0.05. Since most farms were small at the beginning of contract production 
in China, contracting firms had few opportunities to contract with large farmers, even though 
they may have wanted to. As time moves on, they like to renew contracts with those old 
customers, in spite of their small scale, because they have built up the trust with them. Such 
trust is very important, since it helps to reduce breaches of contract and, therefore, improves 
contract enforcement.  Contract enforcement is a serious issue in China, since small farmers 
can easily breach their contracts without any economic loss or legal penalty. Guo, Jolly and 
Zhu (2007) found that contract violation is strongly associated with the farm size. Therefore, 
the contracting firm is more likely to have become the non-exclusionary type if the 
contracting duration is longer.  
      Third, the test results indicate that linear pricing has been utilized to exclude small 
farmers from contract farming. The point estimate of the pricing dummy variable is -0.98, 
with p value 0.02. The negative sign with a small p-value implies that linear pricing would 
significantly reduce the probability of being a non-exclusionary firm. In other words, the 
non-exclusionary type of contracting firm is more likely to use differentiating pricing 
strategy. This result suggests pricing strategy can be a potential mechanism for exclusion. 
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The evidence from China has supported the proposition drawn from the contract model, that 
the common pricing strategy will result in contract exclusion. If contract offers cannot meet 
small farmers’ minimum utility reservations, small farmers will decide not to contract, but 
large farmers will still agree to contract and procure the contracting benefits because of their 
lower transaction costs and higher productivity. Given the current situation in China, 
government policy has not been effective in reducing contract exclusion, as found in the test 
of Hypothesis 1. Differentiating pricing strategy, however, could be used to increase small 
farms involvement into the contract production by providing more flexible pricing terms.       
      Finally, the empirical result suggests that government support provided to the contracting 
firm does not significantly influence the probability of its being a non-exclusionary type of 
contracting firm, but its negative sign shows that the support does help to increase the 
participation rate of small farmers. This finding is consistent with our expectation, but the 
insignificant performance of the estimate might be due to the limitations of the sample. Our 
sample is restricted to one area of China, and the sample size is also very limited.   
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
With the most small-scale farms in the world, China’s government struggles to improve 
farm income and to promote rural development. Historical trends suggest that small farms 
will continue to dominate the agricultural landscape for at least the next two to three decades. 
In the longer run, the process of economic development will increase per capita income, 
diversify economic opportunities, and allow agricultural workers to leave farming in order to 
pursue employment opportunities in other sectors of the economy. The contract farming 
program is one of the current rural development programs that the Chinese government is 
strongly encouraging. Thousands of dragon-head agribusiness firms have been designated as 
the source to provide the contracts. As seen in other developing countries, contract farming 
has the potential to improve the welfare of smallholders. However, smaller farmers can be 
excluded from contracts because agribusiness firms find it advantageous to award contracts 
to large, better-off farmers. The main goal of our paper is to examine whether or not 
exclusion appears to exist in China’s contract farming program, and if so how firms use 
contracts to carry out the exclusion. 
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Table 1  Sample Mean and Standard Error 
  Offered/Accepted  Offered/Rejected Not Offered 
I. Farmer Attributes    
      Age 46.01(0.95) 46.26(0.88) 46.24(0.84) 
      Education 2.38(0.09) 2.19(0.16) 2.14(0.18) 
II. Operation Scale    
      Size 1.21(0.19) 0.41(0.08) 0.40(0.09) 
      Income 0.44(0.07) 0.21(0.09) 0.19(0.07) 
III. External Market    
      Distance 0.41(0.07) 0.38(0.06) 0.37(0.04) 
      Support 0.74(0.07) 0.37(0.05) 0.31(0.06) 
Sample Size 220 390 425  
a. All data are from a 2004 survey of rural farmers in 13 provinces of China, totaling 1035 observations. 
b. The number in parenthesis is the standard error. 
c. Education represents levels of farmer’s education, with 1 for no education, 2 for elementary level, 3 for middle school 
level and 4 for higher level. 
d. Size is in hectares.  
e. Income is based on multiples of 10,000 Yuan, the Chinese monetary unit, where one us dollar is about 7.5 Yuan. 
f. Distance is a dummy variable, with 0 for a local market and 1 for a distant market. Support is also a dummy variable, with 
1 representing the presence of a government support policy for contract farming programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Contract Decision Multinomial Logit Regression Results 
Category Variable   Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
1             
Offered/Rejected Age   0.003 0.007 0.400 0.692 
vs Education   -0.240 0.074 -3.250 0.001 
Not Offered Income   -0.017 0.000 -1.170 0.244 
  Size   0.014 0.006 2.470 0.014 
  Distance   -0.409 0.154 -2.660 0.008 
  Support   0.217 0.152 1.430 0.154 
  Constant   0.597 0.401 1.490 0.136 
2             
Offered/Accepted Age   -0.016 0.009 -1.740 0.082 
vs Education   -0.191 0.090 -2.130 0.033 
Not Offered Income   0.012 0.000 2.760 0.007 
  Size   0.023 0.001 3.410 0.001 
  Distance   -0.405 0.181 -2.240 0.025 
  Support   0.971 0.184 5.260 0.000 
  Constant   0.120 0.486 0.250 0.805 
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Table 3  Hausman Tests of IIA Assumption 
Category Chi2 df P>Chi2 evidence 
1 1.354 6 0.969 for H0 
2 1.555 6 0.982 for H0 
Notes H0: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-1) are independent of other alternatives 
 
 
Table 4. Variables for Firm-level Data 
Variable                Definition                                                                                                                     Mean 
Dependent              y is a dummy variable, defined as the type of firm contractors, where 0 
stands for small-scale farmer contractor and 1 for large-scale farmer 
contractor.  
Independent           TaxRate  is defined as the ratio of the firm’s income tax to the total profit 
                                from the last year      
                      Duration is defined as the number of years the firm has exercised 
contracts to collect the goods from farmers 
                       Fluc is defined as the absolute percent change in the market price of the 
materials collected from farmers in the past three years  
                        Pricing is a dummy variable, defined as pricing strategy implemented 
by the contracting firm, where 0 stands for a linear pricing strategy and 
1 for differentiating pricing strategy 
                        Gov. is a dummy variable defined as whether the contracting firm 
   0.73 
 
           
           0.28 
           
            2.73 
 
   0.08 
           
            0.33 
 
            0.32 
 
 
 
Table 5. Exclusion and Pricing Strategy 
  Constant TaxRate Duration Fluc. Pricing Gov. 
Coeff. 4.39 0.07 -1.17 -2.44 -0.98 -0.05 
p-values 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.49 0.02 0.89 
a. The second row for each covariate is the coefficient estimate.  
b. The third row is the p-value for each estimate.  
c. The response variable is the contracting firm exclusion type dummy variable.   
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The paper has developed an applied principle-agent model with hidden information and 
other driving factors included, to show that the pricing mechanism written into the contract 
could eventually exclude small-scale farmers from contract production programs. This 
exclusion mechanism has been ignored by the literature, probably due to the difficulty in 
modeling it into the contract farming practice. Most of the previous research analysis tried to 
provide a reasonable explanation of contract exclusion based on transaction cost theory and 
the analysis of specific case studies. Their conclusions rely on simple descriptive analysis, 
rather than identifying and developing a specific exclusion mechanism through which 
smallholders are actually bypassed. 
In our paper two types of pricing mechanisms, linear pricing and differentiating pricing 
have been studied in terms of whether they could potentially cause contract exclusion within 
a principle-agent model framework. As shown in the conceptual model, linear pricing makes 
firms more likely to contract with large-scale farmers. In other words, contracting firms using 
linear pricing are more likely to exclude small farmers. Differentiating pricing, also called 
the second best pricing strategy, could reduce exclusion by encouraging more small-scale 
farmers to become involved in contract production. Using this pricing mechanism would 
encourage small farmers to accept a contract with a firm. Ideally, the entire farming 
population could be involved in the contract farming program. The model also suggests that 
social welfare will be improved by adopting the second best pricing strategy. Our policy 
recommendation is that government should encourage more firms to implement a 
differentiating pricing strategy by establishing contract pricing regulations and redesigning 
its grant distribution requirements. In order to reduce contract exclusion, government should 
allot its tax credits and financial support based on the transaction pricing terms written in the 
contract.       
Finally, two hypotheses have been formalized and examined empirically, using contract 
farming data from China. Two levels of data, farm-level and firm-level, were collected 
through separate surveys conducted in rural China. Our results, using farm-level data show 
that farm size has a positive influence, with a strong statistical significance, on the 
probability of being involved in the contract production program. In other words, we do find 
that the contract exclusion is occurring in China. The second hypothesis focuses on whether 
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or not a linear pricing mechanism embedded in the contract model has been used for contract 
exclusion in rural China. We find evidence supporting the role of linear pricing in increasing 
the contracting firm’s probability of being an exclusionary type firm, consistent with contract 
theory.  
The fundamental goal of China’s contract farming program is to distribute more benefits 
to small farmers. From the results of the conceptual model and empirical hypothesis testing 
for China, we are able to prepare evidence-based policy advice concerning the exclusion of 
small farms from the contract program. Our primary recommendation is thereby that the 
government should promote the occurrence of the second best outcome, implementing more 
practicable policies. Standard contracts with two types of pricing offers should be a 
requirement in order to receive government tax credits and financial support.   
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has focused on studying the general contract farming progress made in 
China, evaluating the income effect of contract farming program, and investigating the 
potential mechanism used to implement the exclusion. Three parts of papers develop a 
variety of theoretical models and statistical methods to study these key issues. Part I paper 
examines the extent and performance of contract farming from the perspectives of Chinese 
farm households and contracting agricultural firms. Part II is an applied empirical paper, in 
that it is attempting to test whether or not the contract farming production has improved the 
rural farmer’s income. Part III paper investigates the contract exclusion problem within a 
contract model framework and empirically tests whether or not the common pricing has 
resulted in contract exclusion. The whole dissertation is structured in a way that those 
significant issues have been addressed from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
A number of material results and conclusions have been drawn from three papers. First, 
the farm-level survey indicates that the actual proportion of farms engaged in contract 
farming is relatively low and significantly less than the proportion of farm households 
willing to produce under contract. A lack of contract opportunities is the most frequently 
cited reason, particularly for smaller farms. Farmers identify price stability and market access 
as the key advantages to contracts, while firms consider improved product quality as the 
critical incentive for contract use. Public policies that encourage the adjustment of the 
agricultural structure so as to improve farmers’ options for specialization and 
commercialization should be made right now. Second, we cannot find evidence from 
estimates in the sample selection treatment effect model that contract production tends to 
bring higher income to growers than independent production. Even worse, contract 
participation in each sample becomes harmful to rural growers in terms of income welfare. 
Both Heckman’s two-step procedure and MLE confirm the significant positive estimates of 
the correlation coefficient, which leads to the overestimation of income effects in the simple 
regression model without removing any selection bias. However, propensity score matching 
estimates do suggest the presence of the income improvement gained from the contract-
farming program. As the homogeneous producers are concerned, the smaller income effects 
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with reduced significance are found to be averagely 750Yuan in Sample 4.  This result is 
closer to that in the treatment effect model; in the sense we cannot find the strong evidence 
for the income effect. Finally, in the mechanism design the common pricing is able to 
motivate the contracting firms to exercise the contracts more likely with the large size rich 
farmers, whereas the differentiating pricing could reduce the exclusion by encouraging more 
small-scale farmers involved in the contract program. The hypothesis test does find that the 
common pricing has significantly increased the contracting firm’s probability of being an 
exclusionary type of firm, which is consistent with what we have found from the contract 
model. Therefore, our policy implication is that the government should encourage more firms 
to implement the differentiating pricing strategy by establishing some contract pricing 
regulations and redesigning its grant distribution mechanism.  
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APPENDEX A: PROFILES OF FIRM AND FARM 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Zhongsu Limited is a provincial dragon-head food processing firm headquartered in the 
city of Lanxi in Zhejiang Province. Its products and brand name, are well known throughout 
coastal China. The company was founded as a village enterprise in Dongyang county in 1983 
by a farmer named Zhongshu. Originally, it processed pork – ham for the local rural market. 
As the firm grew, it introduced new product lines and expanded into urban markets. One of 
the newer products is salt radish.  
Salt radish is processed from water radish. Prior to 2000, Zhongsu purchased water radish 
from middlemen who assembled supplies from hundreds of small farms. The supply of water 
radish and its quality fluctuated wildly from year to year. In order to serve an increasingly 
quality conscious consumer and to stabilize production levels, Zhongsu decided to try 
contracting directly with farmers. However, because water radish is produced on many small 
farms, the company found the cost of locating producers and monitoring production to be 
excessive. Zhongsu contacted the local government of Yongchang town, a water radish 
growing area and asked it to serve as an intermediary between the farmers and the company. 
There are no farmer cooperatives or bargaining associations in this area, so the local 
government decided to serve as Zhongsu’s agent. 
Under the contract (see Appendix A) Yongchang town locates farmers, supervises 
planting methods and delivers the output from 200 ha. to the processing plant. In return 
Zhongsu offers participating farmers a 3 percent premium over the local water radish price. 
Zhongsu has had a generally favorable experience contracting water radish and has expanded 
its contracting activities to other crops and regions. 
Huang Yougeng farms in Yongchang town with his wife and 17 year old son – a student 
in the local high school. His wife works full time in a local textile factory. Farming is Huang 
Yougeng’s primary occupation although he does some temporary work in town. The farm is 
0.16 ha. Before 1995 he grew rice. However, high prices for water radish lead him to shift his 
production from rice to water radish in 1996. As a small farmer, he sold his water radish crop 
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to a local middleman and accepted the vagaries of a very volatile market and, in his view, a 
good deal of exploitation by the middlemen when supplies were ample. Moreover if the 
wholesale market for water radish was weak, middlemen might not come to his village at all. 
Huang Yougeng heard about Zhongsu’s contracting activities in 2002. He knew nothing 
about the company or contracting. But he did feel comfortable entering into a contract with 
the local government. Although the contract does not offer risk protection, having market 
access and a premium over the local paying price provided a sufficient incentive for Huang 
Yougeng to continue with his contract since 2002.  
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APPENDIX B: AGREEMENT ON PLANITING WATER 
RADISH 
 
Contractor: Zhongsu Limited Company, City of Lanxi 
Contractee: The Government of Yongchang Town 
In order to bring along and encourage farmers to develop contract farming and optimize 
agricultural structure, thus to ensure that farmers receive the substantial economic benefits, 
both contractor and contractee, through friendly consultation, have reached the following 
agreement on the water radish planting acreage of the farmers and the purchase of the yields: 
1. Contractor will entrust contractee with the responsibility for planting techniques and 
acreage in some villages. Contractee will provide the farm households and the planting 
acreage which should be over 3,000 mu. 
2. Contractee should be in charge of examining and supervising the farmers and to market 
to the contractor the entire planted water radish crop. 
3. The quality standard of the water radish sold by the farmers should meet the demands 
determined by contractor. 
4. Contractor offers a favorable price for the delivered goods: higher by three percent than 
the local market price at delivery time.  
5. On the expiration of the contract, contractor takes priority of renewing it if desired. 
6. This agreement will be valid for two years.  
7. This agreement becomes effective on the date of signing. 
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